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ABSTRACT
The dissertation investigates how supraliminal goal primes affect brand preference
through explicit attitude and implicit attitude and whether the effect of supraliminal goal primes
and/or mood on brand preference is mediated by cognitive load. Chapter 1 develops a conceptual
framework and provides a theoretical background. Chapter 2 investigates how supraliminal goal
primes and/or mood affect preference (Study 1), implicit attitude (Study 2) and explicit attitude
(Study 3) in the context of luxury vs. frugal brand consumption. Chapter 2 also investigates
whether the effect of goal primes and/or mood on preference is mediated by cognitive load.
Chapter 3 considers whether, under a high cognitive load, the effect of goal prime and/or mood
on preference is mediated by implicit attitude (Study 1) and explicit attitude (Study 2).

x

CHAPTER 1. ESSAY ONE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Studies suggest that subtle cues, (e.g., brand names, words associated with a certain goal)
embedded in the environment, sometimes trigger an individual’s goal non-consciously, thus
affecting his or her brand choice (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner, 2008). These subtle cues,
often called primes, can affect choice by triggering goals, or by activating associated semantic
representations through memory (Sela and Shiv, 2009). In priming goals, both Chartrand et al.
(2008) and Sela and Shiv (2009) adapted a supraliminal priming method (Chartland and Bargh,
1996) involving a scrambled sentence completion task. Although a series of studies by Bargh, as
well as other researchers, successfully replicated the effect of goal priming on choice or other
behavioral outcomes, other studies (e.g., Nelissen, Dijker, and Vries, 2005) suggested that goal
priming affects choice only under certain conditions. Consistent with this notion, we argue that
the effect of goal priming on consumer choice represents a complex process and should be
moderated by factors such as cognitive load and consumer’s trait.
Most of these studies investigate the relationship between goal priming and behavior or
judgment. Yet, we do not have a clear understanding of how goal primes affect behavioral
outcomes. Consistent with this notion, researchers call for further research on how goals are nonconsciously activated and might guide judgment and behavior (Custers and Aarts, 2007).
Understanding this mechanism includes answering the following questions: Does goal priming
affect consumer preference with or without changing attitude toward certain objects? Are both
explicit attitude and implicit attitude affected by goal priming?
Houwer and Moors (2007) suggested that “it would be interesting to see whether
unconscious activation of goals through subliminal priming or scrambled sentence completion
has an effect on implicit measures such as the IAT (Implicit Association Test).” Implicit
1

measures such as the IAT may be useful in understanding the process of how non-conscious goal
activation affects behavioral outcomes. Building on the proposition, we may better capture the
impact of goal priming by use of the Implicit Association Test. Understanding the effect of goal
prime on implicit attitude is important, since as the relationship between goal and attitude is a
relatively under-researched area (Freguson and Porter, 2009, p.447).
In Chapter 1, we provide a theoretical framework for the effect of non-conscious goal
activation on preference. In Chapter 2, we empirically investigate how a goal prime, cognitive
load, and mood may affect preference (Study 1), implicit attitude (Study 2) and explicit attitude
(Study 3). Finally, in Chapter 3, we empirically investigate how, under high cognitive load, goal
primes and mood may affect implicit attitude and preference, simultaneously (Study 1) and
explicit attitude and preference, simultaneously (Study 2). Please see Figure 1.1 for the General
Conceptual Model discussed throughout the chapter.
Explicit Attitude

Mood

Preference

Implicit Attitude

Goal Prime




Moderators
Cognitive Load
Trait

Manipulated Variables: Goal Prime, Mood, Cognitive Load
Measured Variables: Trait, Explicit Attitude, Implicit Attitude,
Preference

Figure 1.1
General Conceptual Model
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In other words, in Chapter 2, we study the effect of goal prime, cognitive load, and mood
on each dependent variable (i.e., preference, implicit attitude, and explicit attitude) individually,
in the context of consuming luxury and frugal brands. In Chapter 3, we study the effects of goal
prime and mood on two pairs of dependent variables (i.e., implicit attitude and preference as well
as explicit attitude and preference) simultaneously in the context of wholesome vs. decadent food
brand consumption. Thus, the dissertation answers the following questions; (1) When does a
supraliminal goal prime facilitate preference consistent with the goal prime? (2) Under what
conditions do implicit attitudes mediate the relationship between the goal prime and preference?
(3) Under what conditions do explicit attitudes mediate the relationship between the goal prime
and preference?
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.2.1. Defining Non-consciousness
A consumer may choose a brand automatically without much conscious thought. The
selected brand may represent his/her favorite brand, or simply be chosen out of habit.
Researchers use various terms to describe this kind of behavior, such as automatic choice,
nonconscious choice, or unintentional choice. In order to provide specificity to these constructs,
Bargh (1994) described the term automaticity from four aspects: unintentionality, unawareness,
uncontrollability, and high efficiency. In this study, nonconsciousness means unawareness.
More specifically, an individual can be nonconscious, or unaware of something, in three
different ways (Vargas, 2008 and Chartrand, 2005). First, it refers to a situation where stimuli are
presented for a brief period of time and an individual is not aware of the stimuli themselves (e.g.,
subliminal advertisement). Second, an individual is well aware of the stimulus, but is not aware
of the automatic cognitive processes. Third, an individual may not be aware of the outcome (e.g.,
behavior) of the automatic processes.
3

1.2.2. Non-conscious Goal Pursuit
A goal may be described as cognitive representation that is associated with a desired end
state (Shah and Kruglanski, 2003; Kruglanski, et al 2002; Custers and Aarts, 2005). A goal is an
important concept in understanding consumer behavior (Mitchell and Zhang, 2005). Goals affect
attention (Pieters and Wedel, 2007), impression formation and memory processes (Chartrand and
Bargh, 1996), categorization (Poynor and Haws, 2009), persuasion (Chang and Chou, 2008),
brand evaluation (Labroo and Lee, 2006), and brand choice (Sela and Shiv, 2009). According to
Osselaer et al (2005), consumers pursue three types of goals: (a) consumption goals, associated
with consumption benefits such as a tasty and refreshing beverage; (b) criterion goals, associated
with one’s standard for a satisfying choice, such as maximizing pleasure or explaining your
choice to your family or friends; and (c) process goals, such as the avoidance of negative
emotions. On one hand, consumers may pursue self-regulating goals, where one has to sacrifice
short-term benefits (e.g., eating tasty food) over long-term benefits (e.g., staying fit). On the
other hand, consumers may pursue indulgent or hedonic goals, where one may work too hard,
thus, may force that consumer to take a trip to a Miami beach over a weekend.
Researchers agree that goals can be activated, processed, and achieved not only
consciously, but also non-consciously (e.g., Bargh, 1990). Consistent with this notion, goal
systems theory suggests that there are two types of goals, a focal goal (i.e., a goal where one is
aware of pursuit), and a background goal (i.e., a goal where one is not aware of the background
presence) (Kruglanski et al 2002; Kim and Mitchell, 2008). Background goals reflect an
automatic, non-conscious driver that may be explained by the Auto-Motive Model (Bargh, 1990).
1.2.3. Goal and Mood
People tend to approach positive stimuli and avoid negative stimuli. While positive
stimuli may induce a positive mood, negative stimuli may induce a negative mood. Thus, an
4

individual learns that in a positive mood, it is acceptable to approach an object, but in a negative
mood, it is better to avoid that object. That is why Fishbach and Labroo (2007) asserted that,
similar to the mood as an information approach (e.g., Schwarz and Clore, 2003), people associate
positive affect and approach tendency, as well as negative affect and avoidance tendency.
Although an individual does not use mood as information, when he or she attributes mood to
non-target objects (e.g., Schwarz and Clore, 2003), we believe that after non-conscious goal
activation and a masked mood manipulation task, it is less likely that an individual consciously
attributes his/her mood to an irrelevant object. In other words, in non-conscious goal activation,
an individual is less likely to attribute his/her current mood to an object that is not in context.
1.2.4. Explicit Attitude vs. Implicit Attitude
Implicit attitudes are evaluations that are (a) based on an unknown origin, (b)
automatically activated, and (c) result in uncontrollable outcomes (i.e., out of one’s control,
either despite the individual’s intention to control, or simply because an individual does not view
the outcome as originating from his/her attitude and does not intend to control it) (Greenwald
and Banaji, 1995, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000). While explicit attitudes are influenced
by conscious processing, such as conscious adjustment, implicit attitudes are believed to be
influenced by unconscious processing (Perkins, Forehand, Greenwald, and Maison, 2008, p. 464).
Thus, researchers find dissociations between explicit attitudes (e.g., self-reported attitude
measures) and implicit attitudes (e.g., indirect attitude measures).
Explicit attitude measures and implicit attitude measures are sometimes highly correlated
and other times completely unrelated (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le and Schmitt,
2005). Thus, some studies assert that the extent of association between explicit attitude and
implicit attitude depends on several factors that include (a) self-presentation, (b) evaluative
strength, and (c) dimensionality. According to Nosek (2005), first, when one’s self-presentation
5

concern is high, explicit attitude may be altered in order for others in society to better accept the
response of the individual, while implicit attitude should be free from any deliberate alteration of
attitude. Thus, a high self-presentation concern should result in low implicit and explicit attitude
correspondence. Second, a personally important and familiar evaluation (i.e., high evaluative
strength) should result in a stronger association between implicit and explicit attitude, than a
personally unimportant, unfamiliar evaluation. Third, for those concepts that fit a bipolar
structure, an individual should find it relatively easier to retrieve (i.e., an almost automatic
retrieval) and form an evaluation, than for those with unipolar structure. Thus, a simple, bipolar
structure of concepts should result in a stronger association between explicit and implicit attitude,
than those with a unipolar structure of concepts.
1.2.5. Explicit vs. Implicit Attitude as Predictor of Food Preference
Researchers have studied the predictive ability of the IAT compared to explicit attitude
measures, regarding food choices with mixed empirical results. Karpinski and Hilton (2001)
found no correlation between IAT and explicit attitude measures towards snacks versus fruits. In
the study, where explicit attitude measures predicted behavior (i.e., an actual choice between a
Snickers candy bar and a Red Delicious Apple), the IAT did not predict behavior.
Similarly, Perugini (2005) studied preferences for snacks versus fruit. In the study, the
IAT successfully predicted “spontaneous” behavior (i.e., actual choice between snacks and fruit).
Then, explicit attitude predicted “deliberative” behavior, using self-reported measures, such as
“[T]o what extent would you describe yourself as a person who regularly eats snacks (fruits)?”
The correlation between explicit attitude measures and the IAT was not significant (r = .09).
Roefs and Jansen (2002) studied implicit and explicit attitude towards high-fat vs. low-fat
foods. Interestingly, the finding noted that obese people carry a negative, implicit attitude
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towards high-fat food. Thus, while obese people like the taste of high-fat foods and tend to eat
those foods frequently, they tend to carry a negative, implicit attitude toward these high-fat foods.
More recently, Craeynest et al. (2008) studied attitude changes towards food and exercise
among young, obese people, who successfully lost weight. The study tested whether an implicit
attitude or an explicit attitude toward food and exercise changed before and after the weight loss.
The study found no major attitude change, either explicit or implicit, to explain the successful
weight loss. Thus, researchers find mixed results in terms of whether explicit and implicit
attitude are correlated, and whether explicit and implicit attitudes predict preference and choice
behavior differently.
1.2.6. Semantic Activation vs. Goal Activation
Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) investigated whether priming leads to semantic activation
or goal activation. The researchers assumed that, whereas semantic activation decays after a
delay (e.g., 5 minutes), goal activation increases overtime, until the goal is attained. The study
found that the effect of priming on a perception-related task, which should be mediated by
semantic activation, disappeared after a five-minute delay. Then, the effect of priming on a
behavior-related task, mediated by goal activation, increased after a five-minute delay.
This view is consistent with the activation-striving model (Sela and Shiv, 2009), which
proposes that the effect of primes on behavior diminishes over time when mediated by semantic
activation, given trait-consistent primes. On the other hand, whereas the effect of primes on
behavior persists over time when a goal is activated, given trait-inconsistent primes. In other
words, semantic activation is enhanced by trait-consistent primes, whereas goal activation is
facilitated by trait-inconsistent primes (e.g., Sela and Shiv, 2009). The former may be explained
by the self-schema matching paradigm (Markus and Wurf, 1987). According to the paradigm, an
individual pays more attention, processes with greater intensity, and favors trait-consistent
7

information. This greater intensity in processing trait-consistent information than selfinconsistent information leads to semantic activation.
Conversely, trait-inconsistent primes tend to highlight the gap between one’s current state
and ideal state, when the primes are perceived as positive and desired. As previously reviewed,
this approach tendency for positive stimuli in achieving the goal may be extended to an approach
tendency, when an individual is in a positive mood. This approach tendency for positive stimuli
or for an individual in a positive mood should be observed for goal-activation, rather than for
semantic activation.
1.2.7. Goals and Attitudes
Fiske (1992) asserts that an individual’s goal shapes not only how he or she acts to
achieve his or her goal, but also how he or she thinks. Apart from the view that considers
cognition and motivation to be two separate systems, Fiske’s (1992) argument is consistent with
the theory of goal systems, where motivation is viewed as part of cognition (Kruglanski et al.,
2002). This perspective is a theoretical foundation of the relationship between goals and attitudes.
Ferguson and Bargh (2004) found that pursuit of a certain goal affects the automatic
evaluation of an object that is strongly linked with the goal in memory, but does not affect
explicit attitude (See also Ferguson and Porter, 2009, pp. 465-466, for a recent review on this
topic). As an individual’s goal is activated, the accessibility of that goal and a goal-relevant
object useful to achieve that goal should increase (Kruglanski et al., 2002). This increased
accessibility of the goal-relevant object should result in a more positive evaluation of that object.
Ferguson and Bargh (2004) argued that an individual can efficiently assess the valence of the
attitude object efficiently, with automatic evaluation alone. This positive automatic evaluation of
the goal-relevant object should increase the approach tendency of the goal, thereby encouraging
the goal-consistent behavior.
8

Recently, Ferguson (2008) replicated the effect of goal activation on an implicit attitude
in the context of non-conscious goal activation. In the studies, after completion of a scrambled
sentence task, participants evaluated the valence of subliminally presented objects, with some
goal-relevant, while others were goal-irrelevant. As these attitudes were generated with no
awareness toward those targets, these evaluations were considered to be implicit attitudes.
1.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
1.3.1. Auto-Motive Model
The Auto-Motive Model (Bargh, 1990) suggested that goals may be activated
automatically and may affect processing and behavior outside of one’s consciousness. According
to the model, situational cues can activate goals automatically in three ways. First, general
situational features of a common event may activate associated goals and motives. For instance,
when an individual encounters situational features of a common event (e.g., a restaurant), he or
she may pre-consciously activate associated goals and motives (e.g., eating at a restaurant).
These situational features of common events that take place frequently in one’s daily life are
often linked to a single representation (e.g., associated goal and motive). Kahneman (1973)
mentions the possibility of non-conscious control in constructing responses for simple tasks.
Kahneman (1973) argues that an individual can form a response to a simple task without
interpreting the meaning of selected objects. Second, situational cues can automatically activate
social or cultural norms. Then, once triggered, these norms activate associated goals and
intentions, thus leading to behavior considered to be a norm in the society or culture. Third, an
individual may perceive the goals of other people, which may trigger the goal of the individual
(i.e., a reactive goal). The third process of automatic goal activation differs from the first two
processes in that behavioral features, not situational features, trigger the activation process.
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Bargh (1990, p. 103) noted that other researchers, such as Norman and Shallice (1986),
also developed a model to explain the links between goals and environmental cues. The model of
Norman and Shallice (1986) indicates how some behaviors may become automatic as a result of
frequent learning processes, thereby needing little attention or intention (e.g., a bus driver
becomes so accustomed to pulling over at a bus stop that he non-consciously repeats the action
when he or she drives the family car).
Instead, the auto-motive model suggests that higher-order goals or motivational
properties themselves can be automatically activated to guide actions. The auto-motive model
assumes that situational cues can automatically trigger one’s goal, which in turn activates
associated plans and intentions that lead to certain behaviors. Bargh (1990) argued that this
process can happen without an individual’s consciousness. In other words, an individual may not
be aware that his or her perception, judgment, and behavior are affected by automatically
triggered goals. Thus, whereas Norman and Shallice’s (1986) model suggested that
environmental cues can trigger well-learned automatic behavior without attention or intention,
the auto-motive model suggests that environmental cues can activate a goal or intention, to guide
actions. Bargh and Pratto (1986) claimed that these environmental cues affect people’s cognitive
processes, regardless of their intentions. Similarly, Moskowitz, Li, and Kirk (2004) discussed the
possibility of a non-conscious goal-pursuit, despite a conscious withdrawal from pursuing the
goal (i.e., implicit volition).
1.3.2 Dual Process Models
1.3.2.1 MODE Model
Attitude may be defined as an “association in memory between an object and one’s
evaluation of it (Olson and Fazio, 2009: Fazio, 2007).” The motivation and opportunity as
determinants (MODE) model assumes the existence of two types of attitude-to-behavior
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processes: a spontaneous, attitude-behavior process that involves “a spontaneous reaction to
one’s perception of the immediate situation,” as well as deliberate, attitude-behavior processes
that involve “deliberation regarding the behavioral alternatives.” The model attempts to integrate
two different models of attitudes: one that deals with automatic attitude-behavior processes (e.g.,
Fazio, 1986), and another that assumes deliberative attitude-behavior processes (e.g., theory of
reasoned action by Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). The MODE model offers insights on how attitude
guides behavior by incorporating motivation and opportunity as two moderators of attitudebehavior processes. According to the MODE Model, when people have neither the opportunity
nor motivation to foresee the consequences of their actions, automatically activated attitudes will
guide their behaviors (Fazio, 1990; Gibson, 2008). In other words, only when sufficient
opportunity and motivation are available, does an individual engage in deliberative processes.
The MODE model distinguishes itself from other attitude models such as elaboration
likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) or heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Liberman,
and Eagly, 1989), by employing a relatively broad definition of opportunity and motivation. In
the MODE model, opportunity refers to the availability of various resources to process
information, such as time and other cognitive factors; motivation refers to the level of effort an
individual makes in order to reach a conclusion that affects behaviors and judgments, regardless
of the conclusion. For instance, an individual may want to make the right decision or want
his/her behavior to be accepted by a society. Unlike other attitude models that consider the level
of accuracy to be the main motivational factor, the MODE model considers all efforts to be
motivational factors.
Thus, the MODE model assumes four different situations, determined by the level of
opportunity and motivation. As drawn in Figure 1.2, these four situations are (a) low motivation
and low opportunity, (b) low motivation and high opportunity, (c) high motivation and low
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opportunity, and (d) high motivation and high opportunity (Please see Figure 1.2 and also see
Olson and Fazio (2009) for a comprehensive review). According to the model, motivation allows
for the possibility of deliberative attitude-behavior processes; opportunity serves as a gate that
determines whether the deliberative process initiated by high motivation affects judgment or
behavior. Low opportunity (e.g., an individual does not have enough time to make a choice)
closes the path of this deliberative process, such that automatically activated attitudes will guide
judgment or behavior (high motivation and low opportunity condition). However, high
opportunity allows the deliberative process initiated by high motivation to affect judgment and
behavior (high motivation and high opportunity condition). When motivation is low, an
automatically activated attitude guides behavior and judgment, regardless of the opportunity (low
motivation and low opportunity condition or low motivation and high opportunity condition).
Low Motivation – Low Opportunity
Automatically
Activated
Attitude

Motivational Automatically
Factors
Activated
Attitude

Motivational
Factors

Opportunity

Opportunity

High Motivation – Low Opportunity
Automatically
Activated
Attitude

Low Motivation – High Opportunity

High Motivation – High Opportunity

Motivational Automatically
Factors
Activated
Attitude

Motivational
Factors

Opportunity

Opportunity

Adapted from Olson and Fazio, 2009
Figure 1.2
The MODE Model
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1.3.2.2 Recent Dual Process Model
Recently, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) introduced the unconscious thought theory,
proposing two types of thoughts, conscious and unconscious. The researchers defined conscious
thought as “object-relevant or task-relevant cognitive or affective thought processes that occur
while the object or task is the focus of one’s conscious attention,” and unconscious thought as
“object-relevant or task-relevant cognitive or affective thought processes that occur while
conscious attention is directed elsewhere.” The theory proposes that the following three
principles, among others, determine the relative applicability of either conscious thought or
unconscious thought in constructing outcomes (e.g., making decisions). The capacity principle
states that unconscious thought enjoys a large capacity, thus allowing more information to be
considered, whereas conscious thought suffers from low capacity constraints. The weighting
principle states that unconscious thought typically employs consistent weighting, leading to a
satisfactory choice, whereas conscious thought suffers from noise in weighting, often resulting in
relatively low satisfaction for one’s choice. The rule principle states that conscious thought is
better at precisely following rules than unconscious thought, which follows a rule roughly (e.g.,
only capable of giving rough estimates for a certain calculation).
1.3.3. Mood as Information Model
Schwarz (1990) proposed that an individual use one’s affective state as a source of
information in evaluating an object, by asking “how do I feel about it?” According to the model,
a positive, affective state informs an individual that he or she is in a safe environment, while a
negative, affective state alerts an individual that he or she is in a problematic environment.
Sometimes, an individual misattributes a feeling to be a response toward a given object; this
results in a more favorable response in a positive, affective state, rather than in a negative,
affective state. Unlike other models (e.g., affect infusion model by Forgas (1995)), this
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attribution can happen beyond one’s consciousness (Schwarz and Clore 2003). The “how do I
feel about it?” heuristic simplifies judgment, because he or she can evaluate the object without
evaluating the detailed features of the given object. Thus, in a situation where one’s cognitive
capacity is limited (e.g., under time pressure, or the complex judgment task), an individual may
rely more on his or her affective state to construct an evaluation toward an object (Schwarz,
1990).
However, an individual may not use his or her affective state to evaluate an object, when
his or her current affective state is irrelevant to the given object (Schwarz and Clore 2003). For
instance, when a person is aware that a previous event has induced the current affective state, the
individual may realize that the object was irrelevant and therefore did not affect his or her current
affective state, in which case the affective state would not influence the evaluation of the object.
1.3.4 Self-Schema Matching Paradigm
A self-schema is a generalized view of the self and is derived from one’s prior experience
and stored in memory (Markus and Wurf, 1987). A self-schema is believed to affect one’s
attention, encoding, and retrieval of the information used to guide one’s behavior (Wheeler, Petty,
and Bizer, 2005; Markus and Wurf, 1987). For instance, based on past social experiences (e.g.,
interaction with other people), an individual may consider himself/herself an introvert or an
extrovert. For example, a self-concept as an introvert may lead an individual to decline an
invitation to a party, because the schema facilitates the prediction that he or she would be
uncomfortable at the party when interacting with other people.
The self-schema matching paradigm suggests that an individual favors a message or a
product that is consistent with his or her self-schema (Wheeler et al. 2005). Cacioppo, Petty, and
Sidera (1982) found that an individual has a favorable attitude toward a message that is relevant
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to his/her self-schema, when compared to another, equally persuasive, message less relevant to
his/her self-schema.
1.3.5. Theory of Goal Systems
Some researchers (e.g., Bem, 1972) viewed motivation and cognition as two separate
systems. For instance, the self-perception theory (Bem 1972), asserts that individuals come to
understand their own attitudes through observing themselves. Thus, the self-perception theory
explains an attitude change from a cognitive perspective. However, other explanations of attitude
change employ a motivational approach, such as cognitive dissonance theory. When motivation
and cognition are considered to be two separate systems, motivation is thought to select the mode
of persuasion. For example, one system requires more effort (e.g., a central route) and the other
system requires less effort, relying on heuristic cues (e.g., a peripheral route) (See Kruglanski et
al. 2002 for review).
In contrast, the theory of goal systems proposes that motivation and cognition are not
separate systems. That is, the motivational process consists of cognitive properties that partly
determine which goal concepts are triggered (Kruglanski et al. 2002). Thus, the theory explains
goal concepts as “knowledge structures governed by cognitive principles” (Kruglanski et al.
2005). In other words, the theory assumes that the motivational process can be a less effortful,
automatic, and dynamic process rather than a static, effortful process. For instance, people may
shift their attentions from one task (e.g., writing a paper) to another (e.g., checking e-mail), and
another (e.g., going to a refrigerator to find a snack); each task can be considered a motivational
phenomena with its own goal (e.g., getting a publication, communicating with someone, and
fulfilling one’s hunger, respectively). Kruglanski et al. (2002) claimed that if motivation is
considered a part of a cognitive system, we should be able to better understand this dynamic
process. In cognitive systems, one cue may activate another cue (e.g., associative network
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model). As a result, the theory explains goal systems as networks of mental representations,
where goals and means are cognitively associated with one another. In other words, the theory
considers goals and means to be mental representations in an associative network, which may be
activated. Although the theory of goal systems (Kruglanski et al. 2005) distinguishes goal
activation from semantic activation, thus suggesting that goals are triggered by the “active
pursuit of goals via particular means,” other researchers noted conversely that semantic
associations between goals and means are thought to be passive and without motivational
properties (c.f., Sela and Shiv, 2009).
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CHAPTER 2. ESSAY TWO
2.1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2, we investigate when supraliminal goal priming facilitates a goal consistent
(inconsistent) preference, through analyzing possible moderators such as traits (i.e., materialism)
and cognitive load (Study 1). Then, prior to testing the mediating roles of implicit attitude and
explicit attitude in Chapter 3, we study whether the goal primes and mood effect implicit attitude
(Study 2) and explicit attitude (Study 3) by applying the same potential moderators of
materialism and cognitive load.
These studies will be tested in frugal and luxury brand consumption contexts. Even
during the present recession, many consumers have difficulty controlling their spending.
Sherman (2009) noted that on the average, Americans spend more than they earn. Yet, frugality,
a consumer trait, was neglected in scholarly consumer behavior literature (Lastovicka,
Bettencourt, Hughner, and Kuntze, 1999). Lastovicka et al. (1999) defined frugality as a
consumer lifestyle characteristic, associated with future goal orientation, in practicing restraint in
acquiring and consuming economic goods and services. Frugality seems critical for societal wellbeing by reducing consumers who are in debt. Yet, wealthy consumers remain conservative on
their spending behaviors, while global sales of luxury goods declined by 7% in 2009. Thus, the
promotion of luxury and indulgent goals for wealthy consumers becomes critical in stimulating
today’s economy.
How might we promote goals that are sometimes inconsistent with consumers’ lifestyle
or traits? The idea of non-conscious goal pursuit provides a possible solution. Bargh (1990)
argued that a certain environmental cue activates an individual’s goal, triggering both intentions
and plans, and facilitating goal-consistent behavior, all of which happens beyond an individual’s
consciousness. The entire process can happen non-consciously, regardless of a conscious
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intention. Thus, despite consumer intention, we promote frugal spending behavior toward those
consumers who have a tendency to over-spend, as well as promote indulgent spending behavior
towards wealthy consumers, who psychologically minimize spending during the economic turndown.
2.2. CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS
2.2.1. Goal Prime
A goal prime is associated with the non-conscious activation of a cognitive structure,
inclusive of the ideal state that an individual may wish to achieve, and a means to reach that state,
with associated information (Laran, Jeniszewski, and Cunha Jr., 2008, Kruglanski et al. 2002,
Shah and Kruglanski, 2003; Custers and Aarts, 2005). The study employed two types of goal
primes: a luxury or a frugal goal prime. A frugal goal mirrors consumer lifestyle characteristics,
associated with future goal orientation, to produce restraint in acquiring and consuming
economic goods and services (Lastovicka et al, 1999). Conversely, a luxury goal is associated
with a materialistic, consumer lifestyle, where owning material goods is considered a crucial life
objective (Richins, 2004; Richins and Dawson, 1992).
2.2.2. Mood
Mood is a relatively long-lasting, general affective state that targets no specific referent
(Linnenbrink and Pintrich, 2004, p.58). This study examines two types of mood, based on
valence – a positive mood vs. a negative mood. A positive mood includes such affective states as
happy, pleased, and satisfied. A negative mood includes such affective states as unhappy, sad, or
nervous (see Watson and Tellegen, 1985, for a detailed description of mood structure).
2.2.3. Cognitive Load
Cognitive load is associated with the use of working memory, where task related
information is maintained while conducting a certain task (Shah and Miyake, 1999).
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2.2.4. Implicit Attitude
Implicit attitudes are evaluations that are (a) formed from an origin of which an
individual is not aware, (b) automatically activated, and (c) results in uncontrollable outcomes
(Greenwald and Banaji, 1995, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000).
2.2.5. Explicit Attitude
An explicit attitude may be defined as conscious evaluative judgments about a certain
object with a known origin (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006).
2.2.6. Preference
Preference represents the degree that an individual likes one alternative more than
another (Merriam-Webster, 2010). Whereas choice is discrete (e.g., a choice of one brand over
another), preference is associated with the extent to which an individual likes one brand more
than another brand.
2.2.7. Materialism
Materialism is associated with a consumer lifestyle, where owning material goods may be
considered a crucial life objective (Richins, 2004; Richins and Dawson, 1992).
2.2.8. Category Combination
In this study, a category combination refers to alternative combinations of categories in
the Implicit Association Test. One may combine luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal and
negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury and
negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 for combination 1. Another alternative is to combine
frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then
luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 for
combination 2.
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2.3. HYPOTHESES
2.3.1. Study 1: Effect of Goal on Preference
2.3.1.1. Hypothesis 1 (Effect of Goal on Brand Preference in High Load Condition)
The automotive model (Bargh, 1990) suggested that environmental features not only
activate people’s goals, but guide people’s cognition and behavior without their awareness. The
model suggests that associative links are created in memory between goals and related
environmental features, following frequent and consistent association between the two. That is
why the activation of environmental cues can automatically activate relevant goals, intentions,
and plans. Since what one attempts to achieve may guide how one sees, thinks about, and acts on
goal-relevant objects, research finds that goals often determine perception, cognition, and
behavior (Bargh, 1990, Neisser, 1967). Thus, a supraliminal goal prime should first activate
relevant goals (frugal or luxury) and thereby guide preferences to frugal or luxury brands. Prime
words associated with either frugal or luxury goals should activate related concepts, eventually
leading to higher order goals. As the accessibility of the goals frugal/luxury) increases, the
preference for frugal or luxury brands should increase, resulting in a goal of prime-consistent
preference (Please see Figure 2.1).
The MODE model suggests that when an individual has little opportunity, an individual
is more likely to follow an automatic attitude-behavior process, regardless of motivation. Thus,
when the availability of cognitive resources is limited (i.e., a high cognitive load condition), an
individual tends to follow automatic attitude-behavior processes. The term, cognitive resources,
represents the availability of a working memory. Working memory refers to a system where
task-related information is maintained while conducting a cognitive task (Shah and Miyake,
1999). In order to perform a certain task, working memory requires a certain amount of resource,
which is associated with cognitive load (Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, and Camos
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2007). Therefore, an automatically activated goal may guide one’s brand preference, when the
availability of cognitive resources is limited. Thus,
H1: Under a high cognitive load, consumers prefer brands consistent with the goal prime,
regardless of consumer materialism.

Figure 2.1
PREDICTION FOR H1
2.3.1.2. Hypothesis 2 (Effect of Goal on Brand Preference in Low Load Condition)
The MODE model suggests that under a high opportunity condition (i.e., a low cognitive
load), an individual tends to take deliberative processes when that individual has a high
motivation. Thus, under a low cognitive load, an individual should take deliberative processes
when he or she has a high materialism. For an individual with higher materialism, the
consequence of brand preference between a frugal and a luxury brand should become more
important than for those with less materialism. Thus, a person with high materialism should have
a higher motivation than one with low materialism. In such a deliberative process, the goal prime
should not affect preference. Please see Figure 2.2. for prediction. The MODE model also
suggests that under a high opportunity condition (i.e., low cognitive load), an individual tends to
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take relatively automatic processes, when an individual has low motivation (e.g., less
materialism). The goal prime should affect preference under automatic processing, rather than
under deliberative processing. Thus, under high opportunity (i.e., a load cognitive load) and low
motivation (i.e., a low materialism), an automatically activated goal should guide choice,
resulting in a preference consistent with the goal prime. Therefore,
H2. Under a low cognitive load, (a) consumers low in materialism prefer brands
consistent with the goal prime, whereas (b) brand preference is unaffected by the goal prime for
consumers high in materialism.

Figure 2.2
PREDICTION FOR H2
2.3.1.3. Hypothesis 3 (Semantic-cue activation vs. Goal Activation Explanations)
The preference task in the study is hypothetical and not an actual choice. Thus, when the
prime (luxury vs. frugal) is successfully priming a goal, an individual’s gap between the ideal
state and the current state should remain the same with no satiation effect. Merely preferring one
luxury brand to another frugal brand does not help an individual to achieve a luxury goal.
However, when the goal prime is activating prime-related cues in associative networks, rather
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than as a goal, the trend for prime-consistent preference should diminish over time, due to a
decay of prime-related cues within associative networks.
Thus, we have two competing explanations for the effect of goal prime on preference. If
the goal prime is actually activating a goal, the effect of the prime should not be affected by
repeated preference measures. Alternatively, if the prime is activating prime-related semantic
cues, the effect of the goal prime should diminish over time, thus the effect of the prime should
be affected by repeated preference measures (Please see Figure 2.3 for prediction). Thus, the two
competing hypotheses are;
H3: Under a high cognitive load, consumers prefer brands consistent with the goal prime,
such that (a, goal activation explanation) the effect is unaffected by repeated preference
measures over time, or (b, semantic-cue activation explanation) the effect diminishes
with repeated preference measures over time.

Figure 2.3
PREDICTION FOR H3
2.3.1.4. Hypothesis 4 (Effects of Mood on Preference)
Studies suggest that an individual in a negative mood often lacks self-control, and
abandons healthy behavior or frugal spending behavior, as negative moods induce self-defeating
motivations (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Leith and Baumeister (1996) suggested
that this is because individuals in negative moods tend to take riskier behaviors than those in
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positive moods, hoping for a significant, immediate outcome (e.g., eating unhealthy, tasty food,
hoping to improve one’s mood), but often resulting in a costly, long-term outcome (e.g.,
becoming unhealthy).
Thus, an individual in a negative mood, as a result of a lack of self-control, may prefer
luxury brands to frugal brands, more than an individual in a positive mood (Please see Figure 2.4
for prediction). This is because an individual in a negative mood, instead of a positive mood,
often fails to resist the temptation of immediate rewards (i.e., feeling better by purchasing luxury
brands, rather than frugal brands) and thereby sacrifices the long-term benefit (i.e., saving money
by purchasing frugal brands, instead of luxury brands).

Figure 2.4
PREDICTION FOR H4
Muraven and Baumeister (2000) asserted that self-control consumes personal resources
and an individual can control only a limited number of behaviors simultaneously. When a
negative mood impairs one’s ability to self-control, such resources may be partially used, leaving
less available resources for self-control. Since cognitive load may use similar resources, an
individual under high cognitive load may have less cognitive resources for self-control, than an
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individual under low cognitive load. Thus, the effect of a negative mood on impairment of selfcontrol may be more pronounced for an individual under high cognitive load than for an
individual under low cognitive load. Therefore, we have the following predictions;
H4: (a) As mood decreases (more negative), a preference for luxury brands increases; (b)
this effect is more pronounced under high cognitive load than under low cognitive load.
2.3.2. Study 2: Effect of Goal on Implicit Attitude
2.3.2.1. Hypotheses 5 & 6 (Cognitive Load and Goal Prime on Implicit Attitude)
The MODE model suggests that under low opportunity (e.g., limited cognitive resources
under high cognitive load), an individual’s behavior or judgment tends to be automatic (Olson
and Fazio, 2009, p. 45). In such cases, an individual’s preference should be significantly affected
by non-conscious goal primes. Ferguson (2008) suggested that goal activation affects implicit
attitude, yet does not affect explicit attitude. Thus, a goal prime should have a significant effect
on implicit attitude, rather than an explicit attitude under a high cognitive load.

Figure 2.5
PREDICTION FOR H5 & 6
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Similar to the effect of a goal prime on preference, an individual should have an implicit
attitude consistent with the goal prime. In other words, under a luxury goal, he or she should
have a more favorable implicit attitude toward a luxury brand over a frugal brand than under a
frugal goal. Since luxury (frugal) brands are a means to achieve a luxury (frugal) goal, an
individual with a luxury (frugal) goal should implicitly have more (less) favorable attitudes
toward a luxury brand over a frugal brand. However, under low cognitive load, where an
individual assumes a more deliberate processing style in his or her behavior, the goal prime
should not affect an implicit attitude (Please see Figure 2.5 for prediction). Thus,
H5: Under a high cognitive load, an implicit attitude is consistent with the goal prime.
H6: Under a low cognitive load, an implicit attitude is unaffected by the goal prime.
2.3.2.2. Hypothesis 7 (The Effect of Mood on Implicit Attitude)
Lacking self-control, an individual in a negative mood prioritizes immediate rewards (e.g.,
buying luxury brands to make himself/herself feel better) rather than long-term benefits (e.g.,
saving money by buying frugal brands), more so than an individual in a positive mood (Tice,
Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Thus, an individual in a negative mood may have more
favorable implicit attitudes toward luxury brands over frugal brands than an individual in a
positive mood.
Once an individual in a negative mood lacks self-control, obtaining immediate rewards
(e.g., feeling better by buying luxury brands) may become more important than other long-term
goals (e.g., saving money by buying frugal brands). Thus, an individual’s implicit attitude toward
luxury brands becomes a more efficient means to obtain immediate rewards than frugal brands,
and therefore may become a more favorable goal than that toward a frugal brand.
As the MODE model suggests, under a low opportunity condition (e.g., a high cognitive
load), an individual’s cognition and behavior are guided more by automatic processing,
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compared with a high opportunity condition (e.g., a low cognitive load). Compared with
deliberative processing, an implicit attitude plays more of a role in guiding an individual’s
cognition and behavior under automatic processing, than does an explicit attitude. Therefore, the
effect of the mood on implicit attitude should be more pronounced under a high cognitive load,
than under a low cognitive load (Please see Figure 2.6 for prediction). Thus,
H7: (a) As a mood decreases (becomes more negative), the implicit attitude for luxury
brands increases; (b) This effect is less pronounced under a low cognitive load than under
a high cognitive load.

Figure 2.6
PREDICTION FOR H7
2.3.2.3. Hypothesis 8 (Order of the IAT Blocks)
Messner and Vosgerau (2010) studied the effects of order of administrating the IAT
blocks on the IAT overall results. In the IAT, two categories (e.g., luxury and frugal) are paired
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with either positive or negative words. For instance, Blocks 3 & 4 have frugal and positive on the
left, and luxury and negative are on the right. Then these pairs are switched in Blocks 6 & 7:
luxury and positive are on the left, and frugal and negative are on the right. Messner and
Vosgerau (2010) argued that the order of this combination affects the response time of this
categorization task. In other words, one can combine luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal
and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury
and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 1).
Another alternative is to combine frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury and negative
(on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal and negative
(on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 2). In Blocks 6 & 7, a participant
learns a new category combination that is inconsistent with that in Blocks 3 & 4 which, Messner
and Vosgerau (2010) argued, results in a slower response time in Blocks 6 & 7 than in Blocks 3
& 4, due to cognitive inertia. The study found that due to cognitive inertia, whenever an
individual learns a new rule completely different from an earlier learned rule, it takes more time
to learn and follow the new rule. Therefore, regardless of the compatibility of word pairs (either
of combination 1 or of combination 2), the categorization task in Blocks 6 and 7 will take more
time.
For combination 1, the tendency for a longer response time for Blocks 6 & 7 than for
Blocks 3 & 4 results in stronger associations between luxury and positive, and between frugal
and negative, resulting in an interpretation of a stronger preference for luxury brands over frugal
brands than true preference. For combination 2, a tendency for a longer response time for
Blocks 6 & 7 than for Blocks 3 & 4 results in stronger associations between frugal and positive,
and between luxury and negative, resulting in interpretation of a weaker preference for luxury
brands than over frugal brands than true preference.
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H8: Compared to IAT combination two, IAT combination one results in a more favorable
implicit attitude toward luxury brands than toward frugal brands.
2.3.3. Study 3: Effect of Goal on Explicit Attitude
2.3.3.1. Hypothesis 9 (The Goal Prime on Explicit Attitude)
The effect of goal activation on explicit attitude is limited (Ferguson and Bargh, 2004).
This is because explicit attitude is not as functional as implicit attitude in judging quickly the
desirability and undesirability of objects, preparing for goal-consistent behavior and achieving
goals (Ferguson and Bargh, 2004). Also, under low cognitive load (i.e., high opportunity), where
deliberate processing more likely takes place, we expect no effect of goal prime on either explicit
or implicit attitudes. Thus, under low cognitive load, we expect no effect of goal prime on
explicit attitudes. Please see Figure 2.7 for prediction. Thus,
H9: Explicit attitude is unaffected by goal prime, regardless of cognitive load.

Figure 2.7
PREDICTION FOR H9
2.3.3.2. Hypothesis 10 (Effect of Mood on Explicit Attitude)
We have discussed that lacking self-control, an individual in a negative mood prioritizes
immediate rewards (e.g., buying luxury brands) rather than long-term benefits (e.g., saving
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money by buying frugal brands), more so than an individual in a positive mood (Tice,
Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Thus, an individual in a negative mood may have a more
favorable attitude, not only in implicit attitudes, but also in explicit attitudes toward luxury
brands over frugal brands, than an individual in a positive mood.
Once an individual in a negative mood lacks self-control, obtaining immediate rewards
(e.g., feeling better by buying luxury brands) may become more important than long-term goals
(e.g., saving money by buying frugal brands). Thus, his or her attitude towards luxury brands, as
a more efficient means to obtain immediate rewards, may show more favorable implicit attitudes
and explicit attitudes, than toward frugal brands (Please see Figure 2.8 for prediction).

Figure 2.8
PREDICTION FOR H10
As the MODE model suggests, under a high opportunity condition (e.g., a low cognitive
load), an individual’s cognition and behavior are guided more by deliberative processing, when
compared with a low opportunity condition (e.g., high cognitive load). Compared with automatic
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processing, an explicit attitude plays a larger role in guiding an individual’s cognition and
behavior under deliberative processing, than does an implicit attitude. Therefore, the effect of
mood on an explicit attitude should be more pronounced under a low cognitive load than under a
high cognitive load. Thus,
H10: (a) As mood decreases (more negative), explicit attitude for luxury brands
increases; and (b) this effect is more pronounced under a low cognitive load.
2.4. METHODS
2.4.1. Design
Subjects are engaged in multiple tasks on a computer to collect response latencies. A 2
(mood: positive, negative) by 2 (cognitive load: high, low) by 2 (goal prime: frugal, luxury)
between-subjects design was employed in all three studies. The only difference between the
studies was the dependent variable. In Study 1, the dependent variable was preference. In Study
2, the dependent variable was implicit attitude. In Study 3, the dependent variable was explicit
attitude.
2.4.2. Manipulations
2.4.2.1. Mood
Subjects were asked to recall the happiest or unhappiest event in their lives, using an
open-ended question. Subjects were also asked to describe the event as vividly as possible,
including what exactly happened on that day, and how the event made them feel. This mood
manipulation was successfully used in previous studies (Schwarz and Clore, 1983: Fishbach and
Labroo, 2007; Labroo and Patrick, 2009).
2.4.2.2. Goal
A supraliminal priming method was employed (Chartrand and Bargh, 1996), where
subjects were given work on a scrambled sentence completion task. In other words, subjects
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constructed a grammatically correct four-word sentence from a five-word jumble. Among the
twelve jumbles in total, ten jumbles contained a prime word associated with either a decadent
goal or a wholesome goal. Prime words for the frugal goal include saving, bargain, and
economical. Those for the luxury goal include rich, diamond, and lavish (Please see Table 2.1 for
the full list of prime words and scrambled sentences).
Table 2.1
SCRAMBLED SENTENCES FOR GOAL MANIPULATION
Luxury
Frugal

Prime
Words?
1
ball the throw toss silently
ball the throw toss silently
No
2
Yes
be will swear rich they
be will swear saving they
3
Yes
ate she it diamond all
ate she it bargain all
4
Yes
he lavish drops only seems
he frugal drops only seems
5
Yes
somewhat yacht I am retired
somewhat coupon I am retired
6
Yes
should now be wealthy they
should now be economical they
7
Yes
they obedient him often meet
they obedient him often meet
8
No
millionaire
he
hides
there
over
discount
he
hides
there
over
9
Yes
is it upscale plant very
is it cost-effective plant very
10
Yes
send I mail it will
send I mail it over
11
No
12
high-class alone very are they
cost-conscious alone very are they Yes
13
Yes
sky the elegance blue is
sky the sale blue is
Note: Prime words are italicized only for illustration purposes in the table
For instance, from the five-word jumble, “be will swear saving they,” subjects are
expected to construct the grammatically correct sentence “they will be saving” (the prime word,
saving, is italicized for illustration purposes; this was not italicized in the actual experiment). In
supraliminal priming, an individual is aware of the stimulus itself (scrambled sentences, or prime
words), but they are not aware that the priming is affecting their cognitive processes or their
behavior.
2.4.2.3. Cognitive Load
Subjects in the low load condition are asked to memorize a 2 digit number, while subjects
in the high load condition are asked to memorize an 8 digit number. Subjects are asked to keep
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the number in mind throughout the experiment. At the end of the study, they are asked to recall
the number.
2.4.3. Measures
2.4.3.1. Implicit Attitude
The implicit association test (IAT) is employed as an implicit attitude measure. In the
IAT, subjects engage in two categorization tasks. We follow the same procedure employed in the
research of Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). Subjects are shown frugal and luxury
brand names, as well as positive and negative words. First, they are asked to categorize the word
either as luxury or positive (located on left label) or as frugal or negative (located on right label),
(i.e., Task 1). When a brand name or a word is supposed to be categorized as labels on the left
(i.e., luxury and positive), subjects are expected to push “E” on the key board. When a brand
name or a word is supposed to be categorized as labels on the right (i.e., frugal and negative),
subjects are expected to push “I” on the key board. Next, they are asked to categorize the word
either as frugal or positive (located on left label) or as luxury or negative (located on right label)
(i.e., task two). The response times for these categorization tasks are measured to compute the
average response times for these two tasks.
When an individual’s association between luxury (frugal) brands and positive (negative)
words is stronger than that between luxury (frugal) brands and negative (positive) words, we
assume that the average response time for Task 1 is shorter than that for Task 2. Thus, when the
average response time for Task 2 minus the average response time for Task 1 is positive, we can
assume that this individual has a preference for luxury brands over frugal brands.
Implicit attitude will be computed following the algorithm developed by Greenwald,
Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Among the data from seven blocks (see Table 2.2 for the detail of
each block), the analysis will utilize data only from Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7. First, data considered
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as outliers will be eliminated, including trials where the response latency is beyond 10,000 ms or
trials where the responses are less than 300ms, accounting for more than 10% of the trials. The
former will be eliminated because one single trial is unlikely to take more than 10,000 ms if a
subject is paying full attention to the task. Thus, it is possible that a subject is engaged in other
unrelated task (e.g., thinking about something else). The latter is eliminated because the trials
with less than 300ms latencies are more likely to be considered as random responses (i.e., not
following the instructions).
After this treatment for outliers, the mean for correct response latencies for each block
will be calculated. One standard deviation for all trials of Blocks 3 and 6, and another standard
deviation for all trials of Blocks 4 and 7 will be computed. Response latencies for incorrect
answers will be replaced with the block mean (previously computed), plus 600ms. Then, for
each block (i.e., Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7), we average the response latencies that include the original
latency for correct responses, as well as the replaced latency for incorrect responses, resulting in
Mb3 Mb4 Mb6 and Mb7. Then we compute the differences between Mb6 and Mb3 (Mb6 - Mb3) and
between Mb7 and Mb4 (Mb7 - Mb4).

Also, we divide each value by its associated standard

deviation, resulting in (Mb6 - Mb3) /(SD b6&b3) and (Mb7 - Mb4) /(SD b7&b4). Finally, we average
the two values (Please see Table 2.2.).
2.4.3.2. Explicit Attitude
For explicit attitude measures, 9-point scales (good vs. bad, like vs. dislike, and favorable
vs. unfavorable) were used to measure explicit attitude for each brand (frugal or luxury).
Subjects evaluated five frugal brands and five luxury brands, one at a time. Subjects chose 1 to
indicate an unfavorable attitude (i.e., bad, dislike, unfavorable) and chose 9 to indicate a
favorable attitude (i.e., good, like, and favorable). Summated scales for three items were
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computed, both for frugal and luxury brands. Then, in the analysis, summated scales for frugal
brands were subtracted from those for luxury brands.
Table 2.2
SEQUENCE OF TRIAL BLOCKS IN THE IAT
Block Number Functions
Items assigned to left-key
of
response
Trials
1
10
Practice
Luxury brand names

Items assigned to rightkey response

2

10

Practice

Positive words

Negative words

3

20

Test

Positive words +
Luxury brand names

Negative words +
Frugal brand names

4

20

Test

Positive words +
Luxury brand names

Negative words +
Frugal brand names

5

10

Practice

Frugal brand names

Luxury brand names

6

20

Test

Positive words +
Frugal brand names

Negative words +
Luxury brand names

7

20

Test

Positive words +
Frugal brand names

Negative words +
Luxury brand names

Frugal brand names

2.4.3.3. Preference
Subjects were asked to indicate preference between two brands (one frugal and another
luxury) in several product categories for ten pairs of brands. For instance, subjects were asked,
“If you were to purchase a hotel service, which brand do you prefer?” Then, they are given two
choices: Best Western as a frugal choice or Ritz-Carlton as a luxury choice. For five pairs of
brands, subjects chose “1” when they preferred the frugal brand, “5” when preference for two
brands was indifferent, or “9” when they preferred the luxury brand. For another five pairs of
brands, subjects chose “1” when they preferred the luxury brand, “5” when preference for two
brands was indifferent, or “9” when they preferred the frugal brand. In repeated measures
ANOVA, preference scores for the latter five pairs of brands were reversed. That is, in the
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analysis, “1” indicates a preference for frugal brands and “9” indicates a preference for luxury
brands.
2.4.3.4. Mood
Four items with a 9-point scale (irritable vs. pleased, sad vs. happy, depressed vs.
cheerful, and bad mood vs. good mood) are used to measure mood.
2.4.3.5. Trait-Materialism
We measured an individual’s materialism which is associated with consumer lifestyle,
where owning material goods was considered to be a crucial life objective. The materialism scale
was adopted from Richins and Dawson (1992). See Appendix III for the list of items.
2.4.3.6. Cognitive Load
At the end of each study, participants were asked to recall the number shown in the
beginning of the study, i.e., subjects typed a two or an eight digit number.
2.4.4. Material Pretests
2.4.4.1. Pretest 1: Brand Selection
Pretest 1 was conducted to determine brands that are considered either luxury or frugal.
Participants were asked to evaluate the strength of brand association with frugal or luxury. A 9point scale was used to denote “1” (luxury) and “9” (frugal). In Pretest 1, 62 undergraduate
students evaluated 36 brands (18 potential luxury brands and 18 potential frugal brands). Seven
luxury brands had means below the mid-point (the means ranged from 1.27 to 3.69) and seven
frugal brands had means above the mid-point (the means ranged from 6.39 to 8.52); these were
selected. Please see Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for the detailed results. Repeated measures ANOVA
revealed that the seven luxury brand names (M=2.205) were rated higher in luxury than the
seven frugal brand names (M=7.528) (F 1, 61 = 1601.66, p <.001, η2 = .963).
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At the end of the main study, 203 undergraduate students evaluated six additional brands
(three potentially frugal and three potentially luxury brands) for the analysis. The means for three
luxury brands were below mid-point (the means ranged from 2.16 to 3.13) and the means for
three frugal brands were at least above the mid-point (the means ranged from 5.84 to 6.93.
Please see Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for the detailed results. Further analysis revealed that these three
luxury brand names (M=2.708) were rated higher in luxury than the other three frugal brand
names (M=6.483) (F

1, 202

= 540.390, p <.001, η2 = .728). Thus, these additional three brands

were included in the analysis. Thus, overall, ten luxury brands, including BMW, Ritz-Carlton,
and Nordstrom, as well as ten frugal brands, inclusive of Kia, Best Western, and Dollar General,
were selected for the analysis.
Table 2.3
BRAND IMAGE RATING (LUXURY BRANDS)
Brand
Luxury or Frugal Category
Rating
BMW
1.55
Attitude and Preference
Ritz-Carlton
1.27
Attitude and Preference
Nordstrom
2.92
Attitude and Preference
Four Seasons
2.89
Attitude and Preference
Saks Fifth Avenue
1.61
Attitude and Preference
Armani
1.50
Only Preference
Hyatt
3.69
Only Preference
Rolex
2.16
Only Preference
Neiman Marcus
2.83
Only Preference
Ralph Lauren
3.13
Only Preference
*9-point scale (1:Associated with Luxury, 9: Associated with Frugal)
Pretest 1( N=62), Main Study (N=203)

N
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
203
203
203

2.4.4.2. Pretest 2: Prime Words Generation
Two additional pretests were conducted to choose prime words for the goal manipulation
(frugal vs. luxury). In Pretest 2, 16 undergraduate students completed a free recall task for two
given words (i.e., frugal and luxury). They were asked to list a set of five words associated with
frugal and another set of five words associated with luxury. We also selected a series of words
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from the free association norms database, provided by Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998).
This database provides results from free words association tests for many words, including
luxury, rich, elegant, and others. We also selected some synonyms of wholesome and decadent.
Using these three sources, we constructed a list of 25 prime words to associate with luxury goal
and 24 words to associate with frugal goal.
Table 2.4
BRAND IMAGE RATING (FRUGAL BRANDS)
Brand
Luxury or Frugal Category
Rating
Kia
7.11
Attitude and Preference
Best Western
6.98
Attitude and Preference
Dollar General
8.52
Attitude and Preference
Motel 6
8.50
Attitude and Preference
Wal-Mart
7.68
Attitude and Preference
Hanes
6.39
Only Preference
Days Inn
7.52
Only Preference
Timex
5.84
Only Preference
Sam's Club
6.93
Only Preference
Old Navy
6.68
Only Preference
*9-point scale (1:Associated with Luxury, 9: Associated with Frugal)
Pretest 1( N=62), Main Study (N=203)

N
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
203
203
203

2.4.4.3. Pretest 3: Prime Words Validation
In Pretest 3, 24 undergraduate students evaluated the 49 (25 luxury and 24 frugal) prime
words on both valence and strength of association with “frugal” or “luxury.” Ten primes words,
relatively associated with “luxury,” where the means ranged from 2.625 to 1.833 on a 9-point
scale (“1,” Strongly associated with "Luxury," to “9,” Not at all associated with "Luxury") were
selected for further testing. All ten prime words were rated as positive rather than negative, with
the means ranging from 6.04 to 7.75, also on a 9-point scale (“1,” negative to “9,” positive)
(Please see Table 2.5). Then, another ten prime words, relatively associated with “frugal,” where
the means ranged from 6.04 to 7.67 on a 9-point scale (“1,” Not at all associated with
"FRUGAL,” to “9,” Strongly associated with "FRUGAL") were selected for further testing. All
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of these ten prime words are rated as relatively positive, the means ranging from 6.08 to 7.29 in a
9-point scale (1: negative, 9: positive) (Please see Table 2.6).
Table 2.5
PRIME WORDS RATING FOR LUXURY (N=24)
Prime Words
Luxury
Lavish
1.833
Yacht
1.875
Millionaire
2.250
Upscale
2.292
Diamond
2.292
Wealthy
2.375
Rich
2.417
High-Class
2.417
Elegance
2.625

Valence
6.04
7.63
7.63
7.25
7.75
7.75
6.92
7.54
7.83

Table 2.6
PRIME WORDS RATING FOR FRUGAL (N=24)
Prime Words
Frugal
Thrifty
7.67
Cost-Conscious
7.67
Economical
7.17
Saving
6.88
Cost-Effective
6.58
Discount
6.54
Coupon
6.38
Sale
6.21
Bargain
6.04

Valence
6.08
6.25
7.08
7.29
7.29
6.88
5.96
7.13
7.00

Repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the ten prime words for luxury were rated
higher in luxury (M=2.264) than those for frugal (M=6.685) (F 1, 23 = 171.78, p <.001, η2 = .882).
The ten prime words for a luxury goal include rich, diamond, lavish, yacht, wealthy, millionaire,
upscale, high-class, elegance, and luxury. Then, the prime words for frugal include saving,
bargain, frugal, coupon, economical, discount, cost-effective, cost-conscious, sale, and thrifty.
2.4.5. Procedures
2.4.5.1. Study 1
Several days before the experiment, 96 student subjects completed an online study that
was intended to measure the traits of frugality and materialism. The subjects then participated in
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a study that was administered in a computer lab. The study was administered with E-prime
software to measure response latencies. First, subjects completed a mood manipulation task,
describing either a happy or unhappy event. After completing the task, as a manipulation check,
subjects are asked to indicate how this task made them feel, using a four-item mood scale
(irritable vs. pleased, sad vs. happy, depressed vs. cheerful, and bad mood vs. good mood).
Then, cognitive load was manipulated, followed by goal manipulation (i.e., sentence
completion task).

Next, subjects reported their preferences toward ten brand pairs. Then,

subjects were asked to recall the number that they were asked to remember in the beginning of
the study. At the end of the study, subjects were asked to guess what had been tested in the study.
In this question, subjects were presented with a list of tasks they completed in the study and were
asked to guess how each task was related. This task was intended to identify those subjects who
successfully guessed the purpose of the priming task (i.e., sentence completion task).
2.4.5.2. Study 2
Forty-eight subjects completed Study 2. The procedure for Study 2 was identical to that
for Study 1, except that the subjects completed the IAT, instead of a preference task.
2.4.5.3. Study 3
Fifty subjects completed Study 3. The procedure for Study 3 was identical to that for
Study 1, except that the subjects completed explicit attitude measures, rather than a preference
task.
2.5 ANALYSIS
2.5.1. Preliminary Checks
2.5.1.1. Reliability
In all three studies, the four-item 9-point scales were used to measure how the description
of happy events made respondents feel. Cronbach's Alphas were .958 in Study 1, .950 in Study 2,
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and .955 in Study 3. Similarly, a five-item 9-point scale was used to measure materialism.
Cronbach's Alphas were .849 in Study 1, .804 in Study 2, and .811 in Study 3. Although the
scale originally had six items, one item was deleted to improve the reliability. After the deletion,
Cronbach's Alpha improved from .753 to .849 in Study 1, from .735 to .804 in Study 2, and .781
to .811 in Study 3.
2.5.1.2. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 1)
In Study 1, participants who described a happy event reported that this task made them
feel significantly more positive (M = 6.778) than those who described an unhappy event (M =
3.376) (F

1, 91

= 129.986, p < .001, η2 = .588). Also, the manipulations did not affect the mood

measures. The effect of goal prime on the mood measure was not significant (F

1, 91

= .943, p

= .334, η2 = .010). Similarly, the effect of cognitive load on the mood measure was not
significant (F 1, 91 = .089, p = .766, η2 = .001).
The trait (i.e., materialism) was measured separately a few days before the main study.
Therefore, we did not expect the manipulations to affect the trait measures. The analysis revealed
that none of the following manipulations had any effect on trait (i.e., materialism): mood (F

1, 89

= .099, p = .754, η2 = .001), cognitive load (F 1, 89 = .025, p = .874, η2 = .000), and goal prime (F 1,
89

= .182, p = .671, η2 = .002).
As expected, participants under low cognitive load recalled the two-digit number (i.e.,

78) more accurately than those under high cognitive load recalled the eight-digit number (i.e.,
75893167) (chi-square test = 35.536, p<.001). Under low-cognitive load, all 51 participants
recalled the number correctly, whereas under high-cognitive load, only 23 participants among 48
participants recalled the number correctly. However, as expected, neither the mood manipulation
(chi-square test = .975, p=.323) nor the goal prime (chi-square = .030, p=.863) affected the
accuracy of the number recall.
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2.5.1.3. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 2)
In Study 2, participants who described a happy event reported that this task made them
feel significantly more positive (M = 6.809) than those who described an unhappy event (M =
3.828) (F 1, 40 = 54.356, p < .001, η2 = .576). The manipulations did not affect the mood measures.
The effect of goal prime on the mood measure was not significant (F

1, 40

= .158, p = .693, η2

= .004). Similarly, the effect of cognitive load on the mood measure was not significant (F

1, 40

= .580, p = .451, η2 = .014). The analysis revealed that none of the following manipulations
affected materialism: mood (F

1, 39

= .895, p = .350, η2 = .022), cognitive load (F

1, 39

= .030, p

= .863, η2 = .001), and goal prime (F 1, 39 = .009, p = .924, η2 = .000).
As expected, participants under low cognitive load recalled the two-digit number (i.e.,
78) more accurately than those under high cognitive load, who recalled the eight-digit number
(i.e., 75893167) (chi-square = 12.735, p<.001). All 20 participants in the low-cognitive load
recalled the number correctly, while only 15 among the 28 participants under the high-cognitive
load recalled the number accurately. However, as expected, neither the mood (chi-square = .105,
p=.745) nor the goal prime (chi-square = .639, p=.424) affected the accuracy of the number
recall.
2.5.1.4. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 3)
In Study 3, participants who described a happy event reported that this task made them
feel a significantly more positive mood (M = 6.956) than those who described an unhappy event
(M = 3.309) (F 1, 42 = 82.771, p < .001, η2 = .663). However, the manipulations did not affect the
mood measures. The effect of goal prime on the mood measure was not significant (F 1, 42 = .913,
p = .345, η2 = .021). Similarly, the effect of cognitive load on mood was not significant (F

1, 42

=

1.420, p = .240, η2 = .033). The analysis revealed that none of the following manipulations
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affected materialism: mood (F

1, 42

= 1.080, p = .305, η2 = .025), cognitive load (F

1, 42

= .000, p

= .994, η2 = .000), and goal prime (F 1, 42 = .035, p = .852, η2 = .001).
As expected, participants under low cognitive load recalled the two-digit number (i.e.,
78) more accurately than those under high cognitive load recalled the eight-digit number (i.e.,
75893167) (chi-square test = 21.805, p<.001). All 29 participants in the low-cognitive load
recalled the number accurately, yet only 9 participants among 21 participants in the highcognitive load recalled the number accurately. However, as expected, neither the mood (chisquare test = .025, p=.874) nor the goal prime (chi-square test = .102, p=.750) affected the
accuracy of the number recall.
2.5.1.5. Outlier Analysis
In Study 1, three subjects reported that they thought there was a connection between the
goal manipulation and preference. Although all of these subjects may not have identified the role
of the prime words in the goal manipulation task, these three subjects were removed from the
analysis to avoid any possibility that the goal was consciously activated. In Study 2, none of the
subjects reported a connection between the goal manipulation and the IAT. In Study 3, three
subjects reported that they thought there was a connection between the goal manipulation and the
explicit attitude task. Finally, to avoid any possibility that the goal was consciously activated,
these three subjects were removed from the analysis.
2.5.2. Study 1
2.5.2.1. Hypothesis 1
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of mood, cognitive load,
goal, and materialism on preference. The dependent variable was brand preference toward luxury
brand vs. frugal brand. The within-subject factor consisted of ten different pairs of brands in
different product categories. The between-subject factors were mood (positive vs. negative),
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cognitive load (high vs. low load), goal prime (luxury vs. frugal), and trait (median split of
materialism). Please see Table 2.7 for the results.
Table 2.7
REPEATED MEASURES OF ANOVA RESULTS FOR PREFERENCE
Sources
df
F
p-value η2
Brand
1
24.529 .000
.232
Brand x Mood
1
2.485
.119
.030
Brand x Goal Prime
1
.893
.347
.011
Brand x Cognitive Load
1
1.377
.244
.017
Brand x Materialism
1
.974
.327
.012
Brand x Mood x Goal Prime
1
1.177
.281
.014
Brand x Mood x Cognitive Load
1
.816
.369
.010
Brand x Mood x Materialism
1
1.380
.244
.017
Brand x Goal Prime x Cognitive Load
1
.460
.500
.006
Brand x Goal Prime x Materialism
1
.589
.445
.007
Brand x Cognitive Load x Materialism
1
1.029
.313
.013
Brand x Mood x Goal Prime x Cognitive Load 1
.978
.326
.012
Brand x Mood x Goal Prime x Materialism
1
1.038
.311
.013
Brand x Mood x Cognitive Load x Materialism 1
.566
.454
.007
Brand x Goal Prime x Cognitive Load x
1
.939
.335
.011
Materialism
Brand x Mood x Goal Prime x Cognitive Load 1
1.797
.184
.022
x Materialism
Mood
1
3.700
.058
.044
Goal
1
3.008
.087
.036
Cognitive Load
1
5.810
.018
.067
Materialism
1
3.906
.052
.046
Mood x Goal
1
1.313
.255
.016
Mood x Cognitive Load
1
.954
.332
.012
Mood x Materialism
1
6.658
.012
.076
Goal x Cognitive Load
1
.109
.742
.001
Goal x Materialism
1
.470
.495
.006
Cognitive Load x Materialism
1
5.482
.022
.063
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load
1
5.046
.027
.059
Mood x Goal x Materialism
1
.664
.418
.008
Mood x Cognitive Load x Materialism
1
.130
.719
.002
Goal x Cognitive Load x Materialism
1
.200
.656
.002
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load x Materialism
1
.661
.419
.008
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.
The three-way interaction among goal prime, cognitive load, and materialism on
preference was not significant (F

1, 84

= .200, p = .656, η2 = .002). Although we predicted that

under a high cognitive load, consumers prefer brands consistent with the goal prime, the main
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effect of goal prime on preference was not significant (F

1, 39

= 1.088, p = .303, η2 = .027).

Please see Figure 2.9 for the result.

Figure 2.9
ACTUAL FOR H1

Figure 2.10
GOAL AND MOOD ON PREFERENCE
However, the three-way interaction among cognitive load, mood, and goal prime on
preference was significant (F 1, 84 = 4.512, p = .037, η2 = .051). Under a high cognitive load, the
two-way interaction between mood and goal prime on preference was significant (F 1, 39 = 6.345,
p = .016, η2 = .140). Under a high cognitive load and in the positive mood condition, individuals
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with the luxury goal prime had a higher preference for the luxury brands than did those with the
frugal goal prime (MLUX=8.009, MFRUGAL=6.476) (F

1, 20

= 6.804, p = .017, η2 = .254). Under a

high cognitive load and in the negative mood condition, brand preferences were not affected by
the goal prime (F 1, 19 = 1.016, p = .326, η2 = .051). Thus, H1 was supported in a positive mood,
but not in a negative mood condition. Please see Figure 2.10 for the two-way interaction of
mood and goal prime on preference under high cognitive load.

Figure 2.11
ACTUAL FOR H2
2.5.2.2. Hypothesis 2
Under a low cognitive load, the interaction between materialism and goal prime on
preference was not significant (F

1, 42

= .590, p = .447, η2 = .014). Under a low cognitive load,

only the main effect of materialism was significant (F

1, 42

= 8.563, p = .006, η2 = .169), where

preference was higher for luxury brands for consumers with high materialism (M=6.699) than for
consumers with low materialism (M=5.319). The goal prime did not affect preference for
individuals with either high materialism (F

1, 25

= .307, p = .584, η2 = .012), supporting H2b, or
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low materialism (F

1, 17

= 1.550, p = .230, η2 = .084), rejecting H2a. Please see Figure 2.11 for

the result.
2.5.2.3. Hypothesis 3
H3 was meant to test whether the effect of goal prime on preference is maintained over
time. As was tested for H1, consumers under a high cognitive load preferred brands consistent
with the goal prime in a positive mood, but not in a negative mood. As it was meaningless to test
this prediction in a condition where no main effect of goal prime on preference existed, H3 was
tested under a high cognitive load and in a positive mood.

Figure 2.12
ACTUAL FOR H3
Under a high cognitive load and a positive mood, the effect of goal prime on preference
was significant (F

1, 19

= 5.92, p = .025, η2 = .238). Yet the two-way interaction between

preference order and goal prime was not significant (F

1, 19

= 1.396, p = .252, η2 = .068),

supporting H3a and rejecting H3b. This is an indication that the prime words are activating a
goal, rather than merely activating prime-related associative cues. Please see Figure 2.12 for the
result.
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2.5.2.4. Hypothesis 4
Both the main effect of mood on preference (F

1, 81

= 3.7, p = .058, η2 = .044) and the

two-way interaction between mood and cognitive load on preference (F 1, 81 = .954, p = .332, η2
= .012) were not significant, rejecting both H4a and H4b. Please see figure 2.13 for the result.
Further analysis revealed that under a positive mood, individuals under a high cognitive load
preferred luxury brands to frugal brands, more than those under a low cognitive load (F

1, 81

=

6.21, p = .015, η2 = .071).

Figure 2.13
ACTUAL FOR H4
Also, under a high cognitive load, individuals in a positive mood preferred luxury brands
to frugal brands, more than those in a negative mood (F

1, 81

= 4.244, p = .043, η2 = .050).

However, since the three-way interaction of mood, cognitive load, and goal prime was
significant (F

1, 81

= 5.046, p = .027, η2 = .059), the two-way interaction of mood and cognitive

load on preference should be analyzed in relation with the goal prime. Please see 2.6.10 for
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further discussion on the three way interaction of mood, cognitive load, and goal prime on
preference.
2.5.3. Study 2
2.5.3.1. Hypotheses 5 & 6
An analysis of variance was conducted to assess the effect of mood, cognitive load, goal,
materialism, and category combination on implicit attitude. The dependent variable was implicit
attitude toward luxury brands over frugal brands. The between-subject factors were mood
(positive vs. negative), cognitive load (high vs. low load), goal prime (luxury vs. frugal), and
trait (median split of materialism). Materialism had no meaningful effect on implicit attitude.
Thus, we dropped this variable from the analysis. Please see Table 2.8 for the ANOVA results.
Table 2.8
ANOVA RESULTS FOR IMPLICIT ATTITUDE
Sources
df
Mood
1
Goal
1
Cognitive Load
1
Category Combination
1
Mood x Goal
1
Mood x Cognitive Load
1
Mood x Category Combination
1
Goal x Cognitive Load
1
Goal x Category Combination
1
Cognitive Load x Category Combination 1
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load
1
Mood x Goal x Category Combination
1
Mood x Cognitive Load x Category
1
Combination
Goal x Cognitive Load x Category
1
Combination
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load x
1
Category Combination
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.

F
.186
.546
.874
17.107
.119
1.830
.471
.816
.107
.048
4.223
.002
1.423

p-value
.669
.465
.357
.000
.732
.186
.498
.373
.746
.828
.048
.963
.242

η2
.006
.017
.027
.348
.004
.054
.014
.025
.003
.001
.117
.000
.043

.167

.685

.005

.112

.740

.003

The main effect of goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant (F

1, 32

= .546, p

= .465, η2 = .017). Similarly, the two-way interaction between goal prime and cognitive load on
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implicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 32 = .546, p = .465, η2 = .017). Thus, the main effect of
goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant regardless of cognitive load, rejecting H5, and
supporting H6. However, the three-way interaction among mood, goal prime, and cognitive load
on implicit attitude was significant (F

1, 32

= 4.223, p = .048, η2 = .117). Please see the next

section (Hypothesis 7) for the analysis of this three way-interaction. Please see Figure 2.14 for
the result.

Figure 2.14
ACTUAL FOR H5 & H6
2.5.3.2. Hypothesis 7
The main effect of mood on implicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 32 = .186, p = .669,
η2 = .006). The interaction between mood and cognitive load on implicit attitude was not
significant as well (F 1, 32 = 1.830, p = .186, η2 = .054). Thus, both H7a and H7b were rejected.
Please see Figure 2.15 for the result. Pairwise comparisons also revealed that none of the
conditions were significantly different (p-values>.05). For instance, in the negative mood
condition, implicit attitudes for individuals under high cognitive load and low cognitive load
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were not significantly different (F 1, 32 = 2.650, p = .113, η2 = .076). Also, under a high cognitive
load, implicit attitudes for individuals in positive mood and those in negative mood were not
significantly different (F 1, 32 = 1.825, p = .186, η2 = .054).

Figure 2.15
ACTUAL FOR H7
However, the three-way interaction of mood, goal prime, and cognitive load on implicit
attitude was significant (F

1, 32

= 4.223, p = .048, η2 = .117). Further analysis revealed that the

two way-interaction of mood and goal on implicit attitude under a high cognitive load was not
significant (F

1, 20

= 3.042, p = .097, η2 = .132). Under a low cognitive load, the main effect of

goal prime (F 1, 12 = 1.395, p = .260, η2 = .104) on the implicit attitude was not significant. Under
low cognitive load, the main effect of mood (F

1, 12

= .440, p = .520, η2 = .035) on implicit

attitude was not significant. Similarly, under low cognitive load, the interaction of mood, and
goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 12 = 1.513, p = .242, η2 = .112).
Further analysis revealed that under a high cognitive load and the luxury goal prime,
individuals in a negative mood had a more favorable implicit attitude toward the luxury brand
than those in a positive mood (F

1, 32

= 4.199, p = .049, η2 = .116). Another analysis revealed
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that under a negative mood and the luxury goal prime, individuals under a high cognitive load
had a more favorable implicit attitude toward the luxury brand than those under the low
cognitive load (F 1, 32 = 5.626, p = .024, η2 = .150).
2.5.3.3. Hypothesis 8
The main effect of category combination on implicit attitude was significant (F

1, 91

=

17.107, p < .001, η2 = .348) such that the implicit attitude for the luxury brand was higher in
combination one (M= .959) than in combination two (M=.373), supporting H8. However, the
two-way interactions between category combination and goal (F 1, 91 = .107, p = .746, η2 = .003),
category combination and mood (F
and cognitive load (F

1, 91

1, 91

= .471, p = .498, η2 = .014), and category combination

= .048, p = .828, η2 = .001) were not significant. Thus, H8 holds,

regardless of goal prime, mood, or cognitive load.
2.5.4. Study 3
2.5.4.1. Hypothesis 9
An ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of mood, cognitive load, goal, and
materialism on explicit attitude. The dependent variable was explicit attitude toward luxury
brands over frugal brands. The between-subject factors were mood (positive vs. negative),
cognitive load (high vs. low load), goal prime (luxury vs. frugal), and trait (median split of
materialism). Please see Table 2.9 for the ANOVA results.
As expected, the main effect of goal on explicit attitude was not significant (F

1, 34

=

1.047, p = .313, η2 = .030), supporting H9. Also, there were no significant interactions on
explicit attitude between goal prime and mood (F
goal prime and cognitive load (F

1, 34

1, 34

= .278, p = .602, η2 = .008) and between

= .957, p = .335, η2 = .027). Thus, the main effect of goal

prime on explicit attitude was not significant regardless of mood or cognitive load. For instance,
under a low cognitive load, the main effect of goal prime on explicit attitude was not significant
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(M = 3.108 for luxury goal and M = 2.238 for frugal goal) (F 1, 21 = 1.927, p = .180, η2 = .084).
Please see Figure 2.16 for the result.
Table 2.9
REPEATED MEASURES OF ANOVA RESULTS FOR EXPLICIT ATTITUDE
Sources
df
F
p-value η2
Mood
1
2.771
.105
.075
Goal
1
1.047
.313
.030
Cognitive Load
1
.107
.746
.003
Materialism
1
1.758
.194
.049
Mood x Goal
1
.278
.602
.008
Mood x Cognitive Load
1
.170
.683
.005
Mood x Materialism
1
3.801
.059
.101
Goal x Cognitive Load
1
.957
.335
.027
Goal x Materialism
1
.117
.735
.003
Cognitive Load x Materialism
1
.088
.768
.003
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load
1
.265
.610
.008
Mood x Goal x Materialism
1
.002
.965
.000
Mood x Cognitive Load x Materialism
1
.289
.595
.008
Goal x Cognitive Load x Materialism
1
1.420
.242
.040
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load x 1
.037
.849
.001
Materialism
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.

Figure 2.16
ACTUAL FOR H9
2.5.4.2. Hypothesis 10
Although as expected, an individual in a negative mood (M = 3.106) had a more
favorable explicit attitude for luxury brands than an individual in a positive mood (M = 2.383),
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this main effect of mood on explicit attitude was not statistically significant (F

1, 34

= 2.771, p

= .105, η2 = .075). Pairwise comparisons also revealed that none of the conditions were
significantly different (p-values>.05). For instance, under a high cognitive load, explicit attitudes
for individuals in a positive mood and those in a negative mood were not significantly different
(F 1, 34 = 2.132, p = .153, η2 = .059). Please see Figure 2.17.

Figure 2.17
ACTUAL FOR H10
The interaction of mood and materialism was marginally significant (F

1, 34

= 3.801, p

= .059, η2 = .101). However, further analysis revealed that individuals with low consumer
materialism had more favorable explicit attitudes for luxury brands in a negative mood
(M=3.242) than in a positive mood (M=1.671) (F

1, 14

= 7.388, p = .017, η2 = .345). Among

individuals with high consumer materialism, explicit attitudes were not affected by mood (F 1, 20
= .042, p = .839, η2 = .002). Please see Figure 2.18 for the result. Thus, H10a was supported
only for individuals with low materialism, but not for individuals with high materialism. The
interaction of mood and cognitive load on explicit attitude was not significant (F

1, 34

= .170, p

= .683, η2 = .005). Similarly, the three-way interaction of mood, materialism, and cognitive load
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on explicit attitude was not significant (F

1, 34

= .289, p = .595, η2 = .008). Thus, H10b was

rejected.

Figure 2.18
MOOD X TRAIT ON EXPLICIT ATTITUDE
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1. Hypothesis 1
Although we have predicted that an individual prefers brands consistent with the goal
prime regardless of consumer materialism, this prediction was supported only in a positive mood,
but not in a negative mood. Whereas an individual in a positive mood preferred brands consistent
with the goal prime, the study found that in a negative mood, brand preference was not affected
by the goal prime. Thus, the effect of the goal prime on preference was moderated by mood.
Consistent with the mood-as-information approach, Fishbach and Labroo (2007)
suggested an individual in a positive mood tends to approach the goal while an individual in a
negative mood tends to avoid the goal. Thus, under a high cognitive load, where opportunity is
low, an individual in a positive mood may approach the goal, with a result of goal-consistent
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behavior. Under a high cognitive load, an individual in a negative mood may avoid the goal
prime, with a result of goal-inconsistent behavior.
2.6.2. Hypothesis 2
We have predicted that under a low cognitive load (i.e., high opportunity) and high
motivation (i.e., high materialism), preference would not be guided by automatic processes, and
be less affected by a non-conscious goal prime. However, under a low cognitive load and low
motivation (i.e., low materialism), preference would be guided by relatively automatic processes
and be more affected by a non-conscious goal prime. The results show that under low-cognitive
load, the two-way interaction between materialism and goal on preference was not significant.
The goal prime did not affect preference, regardless of the degree of materialism. However, the
main effect of materialism on preference was significant under low cognitive load. Thus, the
results seem to indicate that under a low cognitive load (i.e., high opportunity), an individual’s
preference is guided mainly by his or her trait (e.g., materialism) rather than by a non-conscious
goal prime.
2.6.3. Hypothesis 3
Under a high cognitive load and a positive mood, subjects preferred brands consistent
with the goal prime. If the goal prime is activating only semantic cues, the effect of goal prime
on preference should diminish over time. Alternatively, if the goal prime is activating a goal, the
effect of goal prime on preference should not diminish over time.
In the study, subjects completed ten preference tasks that included one luxury brand and
one frugal brand. If the goal prime merely activated semantic cues, its effect would diminish, due
to decay in memory. In contrast, the goal prime might activate a goal. In such cases, its effect
would not diminish, unless an individual achieved the goal. This is because the preference task is
hypothetical and therefore not a real choice task, the individual should not have a satiation effect.
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Since the two-way interaction between brand order and goal prime was not significant, the effect
of the goal prime on preference was consistent over time. This indicates that the goal prime
activates a goal rather than a semantic cue, thereby supporting H3a and rejecting H3b.
2.6.4. Hypothesis 4
Although the study predicted that compared to those in a positive mood, individuals in a
negative mood tend to lack self-control favoring immediate rewards over long-term rewards,
thus preferring luxury brands to frugal brands. Also, since a cognitive load may impair selfcontrol, we predicted that the effect of mood on preference should be more pronounced under
high cognitive load than under low cognitive load. Despite our prediction, mood had no
significant main effect on preference. This was true, regardless of cognitive load.
However, it should be noted that a three-way interaction of mood, cognitive load, and
goal prime was significant. This suggests that the effect of mood on preference should be
discussed in relation to not only the cognitive load, but also the goal prime. Please refer to the
discussion for H1 about this three-way interaction.
2.6.5. Hypotheses 5 and 6
The main effect of goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant, regardless of
cognitive load, rejecting H5 and supporting H6. However, as the three-way interaction of mood,
goal prime, and cognitive load on implicit attitude was significant, the effect of goal prime on
implicit attitude should be addressed, not only in relation with cognitive load, but also with mood.
Please see the next section for the discussion of this three-way interaction (Hypothesis 7).
2.6.6. Hypothesis 7
We predicted that as mood decreases (more negative), the implicit attitude for decadent
brands increases (H7a). In addition, this effect should be less pronounced under low cognitive
load than under high cognitive load (H7b). As the main effect of mood and the interaction effect
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of mood and cognitive load on implicit attitude were not significant, H7a and H7b were rejected
overall.
However, the three-way interaction among mood, goal prime and cognitive load on
implicit attitude was significant. Thus, the effect of mood on implicit attitude should be
discussed in relation to not only cognitive load, but also to goal prime. Under a high cognitive
load, the interaction between mood and goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant.
Paired comparisons revealed that under a high cognitive load and the luxury goal prime, mood
had a significant effect on implicit attitude (F 1, 32 = 4.199, p = .049, η2 = .116), and individuals
in a negative mood had a more favorable implicit attitude toward luxury brand than did those in a
positive mood (F

1, 32

= 4.199, p = .049, η2 = .116). Thus, H7a was supported under a high

cognitive load and a luxury goal prime.
This effect of mood on implicit attitude is not explained by a goal-approach tendency in a
positive mood and a goal-avoidance tendency in a negative mood. Instead, it may be explained
by the failure to self-control in a negative mood. An individual in a negative mood may be less
motivated to self-control, favoring immediate rewards (e.g., feeling better by purchasing luxury
brands) to long-term benefits (e.g., saving money by purchasing frugal brands).
Under low cognitive load, the effects of mood, goal, nor the interaction between mood
and goal on implicit attitude were significant. We did not expect the goal prime to affect implicit
attitude under low cognitive load; therefore, this result is not surprising. Further analysis
revealed that under a negative mood and a luxury goal prime, individuals under a high cognitive
load had a more favorable implicit attitude toward the luxury brand than did those under low
cognitive load (F

1, 32

= 5.626, p = .024, η2 = .150); again, this effect may be explained by the

lack of self-control in a negative mood. Lack of self-control should be more pronounced under
high cognitive load, where an individual’s conscious control becomes more impaired due to a
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limited cognitive capacity. In sum, it seems that the three-way interaction of mood, cognitive
load, and goal prime on implicit attitude was driven by a significant, main effect of mood under
high cognitive load and luxury goal prime and the significant, main effect of cognitive load
under luxury goal prime and negative mood.
2.6.7. Hypothesis 8
As discussed earlier, the means for implicit attitude were higher toward luxury brands in
combination 1 than in combination 2 (.959 and .373, respectively). For combination 1, luxury
and positive (categories on the left), as well as frugal and negative (categories on the right) were
administered first in Steps 3 & 4 and switched later in Steps 6 & 7. In combination 2, frugal and
positive (categories on the left), luxury and negative (categories on the right) were administered
first in Steps 3 & 4 and switched later in Steps 6 & 7. Thus, support of H7 is an indication that
administering combination 1 resulted in an improved implicit attitude toward a luxury brand over
frugal brand than by administering combination 2.
This finding is consistent with the argument of Messner and Vosgerau (2010) that it takes
effort for an individual to learn a new category combination in Steps 6 & 7 that differs from a
previously learned category combination in Steps 3 & 4. Thus, in the IAT, the response times for
Steps 6 & 7 should be consistently longer than for Steps 3 & 4. This results in a higher
preference for luxury brands in combination 1 and a higher preference for frugal brands in
combination 2. Thus, from a method point of view, it is important to counterbalance the
combination of categories in the IAT.
2.6.8. Hypothesis 9
The goal prime did not have a significant effect on explicit attitude, supporting H9. Also,
the goal prime did not have a significant interaction with either mood or cognitive load. These
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results, in conjunction with that those for Study 2, is consistent with the notion that goal
activation affects explicit attitude less than it affects implicit attitude.
2.6.9. Hypothesis 10
We have predicted that as mood decreases (more negative), explicit attitude for decadent
brands increases (H10a); this effect is more pronounced under low cognitive load (H10b). H10a
was supported for individuals with low materialism, but not for individuals with high
materialism, regardless of cognitive load. Interestingly, a negative mood tends to impair selfcontrol in individuals with low motivation (e.g., low materialism), but not in individuals with
high motivation. This finding was true, regardless of goal prime.
2.6.10. Post-hoc Analysis 1 (Studies 1 & 2)
The three-way interactions among mood, goal, and cognitive load on preference (F 1, 81 =
5.046, p = .027, η2 = .059) and on implicit attitude (F

1, 32

= 4.223, p = .048, η2 = .117) were

significant. The MODE model suggests that an individual’s behavior is relatively automatic
under low opportunity (e.g., high cognitive load), whereas an individual’s behavior is relatively
deliberate under high opportunity (e.g., low cognitive load). Thus, under a high cognitive load,
the pattern of a two-way interaction of mood and goal prime on implicit attitude should be
similar to that on preference. Please see Figures 2.19 & 2.20.
Under high cognitive load and a frugal goal prime, preference (F 1, 81 = .068, p = .795, η2
= .001) or implicit attitude (F 1, 32 = .135, p = .715, η2 = .004) were unaffected by mood (positive
vs. negative). Both preference and implicit attitude plots, under a high cognitive load and frugal
goal prime, show a similar, flat line across positive and negative mood, as expected. However,
under a high cognitive load and a luxury goal prime, with both preference and implicit attitude
significantly different across positive mood and negative mood, the direction of the plots lay in
the opposite direction.
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Figure 2.19
MOOD X COGNITIVE LOAD X GOAL PRIME ON PREFERENCE

Figure 2.20
MOOD X COGNITIVE LOAD X GOAL PRIME ON IMPLICIT ATTITUDE
2.6.11. Post-hoc Analysis 2 (Studies 1 & 3)
Whereas a three-way interaction of mood, goal, and cognitive load on preference was
significant (F

1, 81

= 5.046, p = .027, η2 = .059), the same three-way interaction of mood,

cognitive load, and goal prime on explicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 34 = .265, p = .610, η2
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= .008). A paired comparison on explicit attitude revealed that no two means in the three-way
interaction plots were significantly different from one another (See Figure 2.21).

Figure 2.21
MOOD X COGNITIVE LOAD X GOAL PRIME ON EXPLICIT ATTITUDE
As discussed earlier, according to the MODE model, an individual’s behavior is
relatively deliberate under high opportunity (e.g., low cognitive load). Thus, under a low
cognitive load, the pattern of the two-way interaction of mood and goal prime on explicit attitude
should be similar to that on preference. Under a low cognitive load, preference was indifferent
to mood, either in a luxury goal prime (F
prime (F

1, 81

1, 81

= .007, p = .934, η2 = .000) or in a frugal goal

= .906, p = .344, η2 = .011). Similarly, under low cognitive load, explicit attitude

was indifferent of mood under either the luxury goal prime (F 1, 34 = .309, p = .582, η2 = .009) or
the frugal goal prime (F 1, 34 = .546, p = .465, η2 = .016). This is illustrated as relatively flat lines
(both low load x Frugal, low load x Luxury) across positive and negative mood conditions in
preference and explicit attitude interactions. Please see Figures 2.19 and 2.21. Although under a
low cognitive load, the main effect of goal was not significant, either on preference (F
1.958, p = .169, η2 = .045) or on explicit attitude (F
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1, 21

1, 42

=

= 1.927, p = .180, η2 = .084), the low-

load and luxury plots were constantly above the low-load and frugal plots for both preference
and explicit attitude plots.
2.6.12. Post-hoc Analysis 3 (Cognitive Load and Trait on Preference)
A two way interaction between cognitive load and materialism on preference was
significant (F

1, 81

= 5.482, p = .022, η2 = .063). Further analysis revealed that in a low load

condition, the main effect of materialism was significant (F

1, 42

= 8.563, p = .006, η2 = .169),

with means of 5.319 for low materialism and 6.699 for high materialism, supporting H6a. In a
high load condition, the main effect of materialism was not significant (F 1, 39 = .074, p = .788, η2
= .002). Please see Figure 2.22.

Figure 2.22
COGNITIVE LOAD X TRAIT (MATERIALISM) ON PREFERENCE
There was a significant two-way interaction of materialism and cognitive load on
preference. Under low cognitive load, the main effect of materialism was significant, resulting in
trait (materialism) consistent preference. Under high cognitive load, the main effect of
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materialism was not significant. The result indicates that under a high cognitive load, where
relatively automatic processing take place, it is a non-conscious goal prime, in conjunction with a
mood that affects preference, but not trait (e.g., materialism). Then, under a low cognitive load,
where relatively deliberative, conscious processing takes place, one’s trait (e.g., materialism)
may play more roles in shaping preference than a non-conscious goal prime.
Materialism is an example of self-schema or cognitive representations about self that
originates from experiences of the individual (Markus 1977). Although the self-schema matching
paradigm suggests that an individual tends to form favorable attitudes toward messages or
products consistent with self-schema or the individual’s personality characteristics, the
mechanism of this effect is not clear; thus, the significance of its impact on persuasion is
undetermined (Wheeler et al. 2005).
One explanation for this phenomenon is that especially when an individual’s involvement
is low, consistency between presented messages or objects and self-schema works as both
positive cues and as heuristics, thereby improving the individual’s attitude towards the messages
or objects (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Wheeler, and Bizer, 2000; Wheeler et al. 2005).
Thus, when an individual with a high, frugal-spending self-schema is presented with frugal
brands (i.e., self-schema matching), his or her favorability toward these brands are enhanced,
resulting in a more favorable explicit attitude toward frugal brands than toward luxury brands.
Similarly, an individual with a high materialism self-schema would prefer luxury brands
to frugal brands, because luxury brands, instead of frugal brands, would match his or her selfschema. However, under a high cognitive load, the goal prime, instead of the trait, should guide
an individual’s preference or behavior. Thus, only in a low cognitive load condition, where a
goal prime may have less influence on an individual’s preference, a materialism trait should
facilitate the trait-consistent preference.
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2.6.13. Overall Implication (All Studies)
The effects of goal prime on both preference and implicit attitude were moderated by
mood and cognitive load. However, the goal prime, mood, and cognitive load had no significant
effects on explicit attitude. This indicates that the effect of goal prime on preference is
sometimes mediated by an implicit attitude, rather than by an explicit attitude.
However, although we predicted that under a high cognitive load, the patterns of two-way
interactions of mood and goal prime on implicit attitude and preference would be similar, this
was not always true. Given a luxury goal prime under a high cognitive load, the effect of the goal
prime on implicit attitude and preference lay in the opposite direction.
In addition, these studies were intended to test the effect of the goal prime, mood, and
cognitive load on each dependent variable separately to see whether these manipulations had an
impact not only on preference, but also on explicit or implicit attitudes. Thus, we did not test for
a simultaneous effect of these manipulations on three dependent variables. We find that the
effect of the goal prime becomes more pronounced under high cognitive load. Thus, in order to
understand the effect of the goal prime and mood on both preference and implicit/explicit
attitude, we conduct two different studies in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3. ESSAY THREE
3. 1. Introduction
In Chapter 2, we found that the effect of goal primes on preference and implicit attitude is
moderated by mood and cognitive load. However, goal primes do not affect explicit attitude.
Since the effect of goal prime was more pronounced under a high cognitive load as predicted,
Chapter 3 focuses on the high cognitive load condition. Extending Chapter 2, we investigate
whether the effects of goal primes on preference are mediated by implicit attitude, rather than
explicit attitude. Further, this chapter investigates the effect of the goal prime on preference in
the context of decadent and wholesome food brand consumption.
The effects of non-conscious goal primes on food preference is an important topic not
only managerially, but also for society’s well-being. For example, 60 percent of Americans are
considered obese or overweight (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 7). As consumers become more
health conscious, many companies are accelerating their efforts to develop healthier foods. For
instance, PepsiCo hopes to triple the sales of healthier food within the next 10 years (Bymes,
2010).
Despite intentions to eat healthier foods, consumers often feel compelled to purchase
unhealthy foods (Weijzen, Graaf, and Dijksterhuis, 2008). Also, social marketing that attempts to
persuade people to eat healthy has not seen much success (Harker, Sharma, Harker, and
Reinhard, 2010), resulting in a continuance of obesity and other health issues associated with
eating unhealthy food.
In sum, we investigate how goal primes may result in prime-consistent preferences. In the
context of consuming decadent vs. wholesome brands, we study (1) how goal primes nonconsciously guide preference; (2) how the goal prime preference relationship is mediated by

66

implicit attitude and explicit attitude; and (3) how mood affects implicit/explicit attitude and
preference.
3.2. CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS
3.2.1. Goal Prime
Goal primes are associated with a non-conscious activation of a cognitive structure that
includes the ideal state that an individual wishes to achieve, its means to reach that state, and its
associated information (Laran, Jeniszewski, and Cunha Jr., 2008, Kruglanski et al. 2002, Shah
and Kruglanski, 2003; Custers and Aarts, 2005). We employed two types of goal primes, a
decadent and a wholesome goal prime. Whereas a decadent goal is associated with indulging
oneself, a wholesome goal is associated with promoting the well-being of an individual
(Merriam-Webster, 2010).
3.2.2. Mood
Mood is defined as relatively long lasting general affective states without a particular
referent (Linnenbrink and Pintrich, 2004, p58). In this study, we have two types of mood based
on valence: a positive mood vs. a negative mood. A positive mood includes such affective states
as happy, pleased, and satisfied. A negative mood includes such affective states as unhappy, sad,
and nervous (See Watson and Tellegen (1985) for the detailed description of mood structure).
3.2.3. Cognitive Load
Cognitive load is associated with the use of a working memory as a system, where taskrelated information is maintained while conducting a certain task (Shah and Miyake, 1999).
3.2.4. Implicit Attitude
Implicit attitudes are evaluations that (a) are formed from an origin of which an
individual is not aware; (b) are automatically activated; and (c) results in uncontrollable
outcomes (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000).
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3.2.5. Explicit Attitude
An explicit attitude is defined as a conscious evaluative judgment about a certain object
with a known origin (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006).
3.2.6. Preference
Preference is associated with the degree that an individual likes one alternative more than
another alternative (Merriam-Webster, 2010). Whereas choice is discrete (e.g., the choice of one
brand over another brand), preference is associated with the extent to which an individual likes
one brand more than another brand.
3.2.7. Self-Control
Self-control is defined as “a capacity to change and adapt the self so as to produce a better,
more optimal fit between self and world (e.g., Rothbaum et al., 1982) (c.f., Tangney, Baumeister, and
Boone, 2004).”

3.2.8. Category Combination
In this study, a category combination refers to alternative combinations of categories in
the IAT. One can combine luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal and negative (on the right)
in Blocks 3 & 4, and then frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury and negative (on the right)
in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., combination 1). Another alternative is to combine frugal and positive (on
the left) and luxury and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then luxury and positive (on
the left) and frugal and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., combination 2).
3.3. HYPOTHESES
3.3.1. The Effect of Goal Prime on Preference
3.3.1.1. Hypothesis 1 (Effect of Goal Prime on Preference)
As discussed in Chapter 2, the automotive model (Bargh, 1990) suggests that
environmental features not only activate consumer goals, but also cognition and behavior
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without their awareness. Thus, a supraliminal goal prime should first activate relevant goals
(wholesome or decadent) and guide preferences toward wholesome or decadent brands. Prime
words that are associated with either wholesome or decadent goals should activate related
concepts, eventually activating higher order goals of wholesome or decadent. As the accessibility
of the wholesome (decadent) goals increase, the preference for wholesome (decadent) brands
should increase, resulting in a goal consistent preference.

Figure 3.1
PREDICTION FOR H1 (Study 1 & 2)
The MODE model suggests that when individuals lack opportunity, they are more likely
to employ automatic attitude-behavior processes regardless of motivation. Thus, when cognitive
resources are limited (i.e., high cognitive load condition), an individual tends to follow automatic
attitude-behavior processes. The term cognitive resources means the availability of working
memory. Working memory refers to a system where task-related information is maintained while
conducting a cognitive-task (Shah and Miyake 1999). In order to perform a certain task, working
memory requires a certain amount of resources (Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, and
Camos 2007). Therefore, an automatically activated goal may guide one’s behavior, such as
brand preference when the availability of cognitive resources is limited. Thus,
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H1: Under high cognitive load, consumers prefer brands consistent with the goal prime.
(Please see Figure 3.1 for prediction.)
3.3.1.2. Hypothesis 2 (Goal Activation vs. Semantic Cue Activation Explanations)
Since the preference task in the study is hypothetical and not an actual choice, we do not
expect a satiation effect with prime-consistent preference behavior. However, if the prime is only
activating prime-related cues in associative networks, the trend of prime-consistent preference in
repeated trials should diminish over time, due to memory decay. Thus, if the prime is activating a
goal, prime-consistent preference should not have an order effect. However, if the prime is
activating semantic cues, the effect of the prime should diminish over time and prime-consistent
preference should have an order effect. Please see Figure 3.2 for prediction. Thus, similar to our
prediction in Chapter 2, we have the following two competing hypotheses;
H2: Consumers under high cognitive load prefer brands consistent with the goal prime
such that, (a, goal activation explanation) the effect is constant with repeated preference
measures over time, or (b, semantic-cue activation explanation) the effect diminishes
with repeated preference measures over time.

Figure 3.2
PREDICTION FOR H2
3.3.2. Mediation Tests
We will test the mediating roles of explicit attitude and implicit attitude on the
relationship between the goal prime and preference. First, in Study 1, we will test the mediating
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roles of implicit attitude on the relationship between the goal prime and preference (Please see
Figure 3.3). Then in Study 2, we will test the mediating roles of explicit attitude on the
relationship between the goal prime and preference (Please see Figure 3.4). Subsequent
discussions will introduce the path models and associated hypotheses for Study 1 and Study 2.
3.3.2.1. Hypothesis 3 (The Direct Effect of Goal Prime on Preference)
According to the theory of goal systems, where goals are considered part of the cognitive
system, the goal prime should activate goals, resulting in an attitude consistent with the goal
prime and then, lead to preference consistent with the attitude. Ferguson and Porter (2009)
argued that the effect of the goal prime should be captured by the implicit attitude, but not by the
explicit attitude. Thus, the effect of goal prime on preference should be fully mediated by
implicit attitude (Study1). Thus, there is no direct effect of the goal prime on preference (See
Figure 3.3).
H3a: There should be no direct effect of the goal prime on preference.
Mood
H7
H6a

Category
Combination

H8

Implicit Attitude

H4a
H3a
Supraliminal Goal
Prime
Figure 3.3
PATH MODEL (STUDY 1)
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H5a
Preference

However, explicit attitude should not mediate the effect of the goal prime on preference
(Study 2). Instead, the goal prime should have a direct effect on preference (see Figure 3.4). Thus,
H3b: There should be a positive direct effect of the goal prime on preference.

Mood
H7
H6b
Explicit Attitude

H5b
Preference

H4b
Supraliminal Goal
Prime

H3b

Figure 3.4
PATH MODEL (STUDY 2)
3.3.2.2. Hypothesis 4 (The Effect of Goal Prime on Attitudes)
Goals (i.e., a higher order more abstract goal than subordinate goals), subordinate goals,
and means to achieve goals are mental representations, connected by associative links in memory
(Kruglanski et al. 2002). As the automotive model suggests, when goals and their related
environmental features are frequently and consistently associated with one another, these goals
and environmental features are associatively linked together in memory (Bargh, 1990). Thus, as
a goal prime non-consciously activates associated goals, it may also activate its means.
In other words, to achieve a wholesome (decadent) goal, one needs to consume
wholesome (decadent) food or brands. So, wholesome (decadent) goals may be linked together
with their means (e.g., wholesome (decadent) brands) in memory. As goals are activated, the
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implicit evaluation for its means should increase. Consistent with this notion, Ferguson and
Bargh (2004) suggested that when one is pursuing a goal, one has a positive, implicit evaluation
toward objects that are strongly related to the goals. Please see Figure 3.3 for prediction. Thus,
H4a: Under a high cognitive load, an implicit attitude is consistent with the goal prime.
Whereas activation of a goal may affect how one spontaneously evaluates goal-related
objects, thereby resulting in a positive implicit attitude toward these objects, it should affect
explicit evaluation less (Ferguson and Porter, 2009; Ferguson and Bargh 2004). Ferguson and
Porter (2009) believed that motivational properties should be captured uniquely by implicit
attitude, but not by explicit attitude. When one’s goal is non-consciously activated, one is not
aware of pursuing a goal. Thus, the effect of a non-consciously activated goal on explicit attitude
should be limited. Please see Figure 3.4 for prediction. Thus,
H4b: Under a high cognitive load, an explicit attitude is unaffected by the goal prime.
3.3.2.3. Hypothesis 5 (Explicit and Implicit Attitudes on Preference)
The MODE model suggests that when opportunity is limited (e.g., limited cognitive
capacity), automatically activated attitudes will guide judgment and behavior. Even when one’s
motivation is high, consumers with low opportunity limit deliberative processing, where
behavior is guided more by explicit attitude than by implicit attitude. Thus, regardless of one’s
motivation, consumers with low opportunity employ automatically activated attitudes and
behaviors. In this study, where all subjects are under high cognitive load, the preference for
decadent brands over wholesome brands would be better guided by implicit attitude than by
explicit attitude. Please see Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Thus,

73

H5: Under a high cognitive load, (a) implicit attitude has a positive effect on preference;
(b) explicit attitude has a positive effect on preference; and (c) implicit attitude more strongly
affects preference than an explicit attitude.
3.3.2.4. Hypothesis 7 (The Effect of Mood on Preference)
Studies suggest that individuals in negative moods lack self-control, thus abandoning
healthy behaviors or wholesome eating behavior, since negative moods induce instant
gratification (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Leith and Baumeister (1996) suggested
that this is because individuals in negative moods tend to exhibit riskier behaviors than those in
positive moods, hoping for better immediate outcomes (e.g., eating unhealthy, tasty food, hoping
to improve the mood), but, such behavior frequently results in costly, long-term outcomes (e.g.,
getting unhealthy or gaining weight). Thus, an individual in a negative mood may prefer
decadent brands to wholesome brands, compared to an individual in a positive mood. Please see
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 for this prediction. An individual in a negative mood often fails to resist the
temptation of immediate rewards (i.e., prefers decadent brands to wholesome brands) and
thereby sacrifices the long-term benefits (i.e., staying healthy). Thus,
H7: Under a high cognitive load, as mood decreases (more negative), the preference for
decadent brands increases.
3.3.2.5. Hypothesis 6 (The Effect of Mood on Attitude)
An individual in a negative mood prioritizes immediate rewards (e.g., eating decadent,
perhaps unhealthy food) over long-term benefits (e.g., staying healthy), more so than an
individual in a positive mood. Thus, an individual in a negative mood may have more favorable
implicit and explicit attitudes toward decadent brands than wholesome brands compared to an
individual in a positive mood. Please see Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Thus,
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H6: Under a high cognitive load, as mood decreases (more negative), (a) an implicit
attitude for decadent brands increases; and (b) an explicit attitude for decadent brands
increases.
3.3.2.6. Hypothesis 8 (Order of the IAT Blocks)
Messner and Vosgerau (2010) studied order effects in the administration of the IAT
blocks on the IAT overall results. In the IAT, two categories (i.e., decadent and wholesome) are
paired with either positive or negative words. For instance, Blocks 3 & 4 have wholesome and
positive on the left, with decadent and negative on the right. These pairs are then switched in
Blocks 6 & 7, with decadent and positive on the left and wholesome and negative on the right.
Messner and Vosgerau (2010) argued that the order of this combination affects the response time
of this categorization task. In other words, one can combine decadent and positive (on the left)
and wholesome and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then wholesome and positive
(on the left) and decadent and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this
combination 1). Another alternative is to combine wholesome and positive (on the left) and
decadent and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then decadent and positive (on the left)
and wholesome and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 2). In
Blocks 6 & 7, a participant learns a new category combination that is inconsistent with that in
Block 3 & 4. Messner and Vosgerau (2010) argued that this new combination results in a slower
response time in Blocks 6 & 7 than in Blocks 3 & 4, due to cognitive inertia. Whenever an
individual learns a new rule that completely differs from a rule learned earlier, it takes more time
to learn and follow that rule, due to cognitive inertia. Regardless of the compatibility of word
pairing in either combination 1 or combination 2, the categorization task in Block 6 & 7 takes
more time.
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In combination 1, the tendency for longer response times for Blocks 6 & 7, compared to
Blocks 3 & 4, results in stronger associations between decadent and positive, and between
wholesome and negative, thus suggesting a stronger preference for decadent brands to
wholesome brands, than a true preference. For combination 2, the tendency for longer response
times for Blocks 6 & 7 than Blocks 3 & 4 results in stronger associations between wholesome
and positive, and between decadent and negative, suggesting a weaker preference of decadent
brands to wholesome brands, than a true preference (Please see Figure 3.3).
H8: Under a high cognitive load, compared to IAT combination 2, the IAT combination
1 results in a more favorable implicit attitude toward decadent brands than toward
wholesome brands.
3.4 METHODS
3.4.1. Design
Subjects engage in multiple tasks on a computer to collect response latencies. A 2 (mood:
positive, negative) by 2 (goal: wholesome, decadent) between-subject design is employed. All
subjects are given the high-cognitive load task. In Study 1, the dependent variable was implicit
attitude and preference. In Study 2, the dependent variable was explicit attitude and preference.
3.4.2 Manipulations
3.4.2.1. Mood
Subjects were asked to recall the happiest or unhappiest event in each person’s life in an
open-ended question. They were asked to describe the event as vividly as possible, including
what happened on that day, and how the event made them feel. This mood manipulation was
successfully used in several other studies (Schwarz and Clore, 1983: Fishbach and Labroo, 2007;
Patrick and Labroo, 2009).
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3.4.2.2. Goal
Similar to the study in Essay 2, supraliminal priming is employed (Chartrand and Bargh,
1996) to manipulate the goal by using different prime words. Subjects were given a scrambled
sentence completion task. They constructed a grammatically correct four-word sentence from a
five-word jumble. Among the twelve jumbles in total, ten jumbles contained a prime word
associated with either a decadent goal or a wholesome goal. Prime words for the wholesome goal
included nutritious, healthy, hearty, and others. Those for the decadent goal included luxury, rich,
lavish, and others (See Tables 3.1 for the full list of prime words). For instance, from the fiveword jumble, “be will swear nutritious they,” subjects are expected to construct a grammatically
correct sentence “they will be very nutritious.” (The prime word is italicized for illustration
purposes; this was not the case in the actual experiment).
3.4.2.3. Cognitive Load
All subjects are given a high load condition and are asked to memorize an eight digit
number. Subjects are asked to keep the number in mind throughout the experiment. At the end of
the study, they are asked to recall the number by choosing the correct number from a given list.
3.4.3 Measures
3.4.3.1. Implicit Attitude
The implicit association test (IAT) is employed as an implicit attitude measure. In IAT,
subjects engage in two categorization tasks. We follow the same procedure employed in
Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). Subjects are shown wholesome and decadent brand
names, together with positive and negative words. First, the subjects are asked to categorize the
word as either decadent or positive (located on left label), or as wholesome or negative (located
on right label) (i.e., Task 1). When a brand name or a word is supposed to be categorized as
labels on the left (i.e., decadent and positive), subjects are expected to push “E” on the key board.
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Table 3.1
SCRAMBLED SENTENCES FOR GOAL MANIPULATION
Decadent
Wholesome
ball the throw toss silently
ball the throw toss silently
be will swear rich they
be will swear nutritious they
ate she it gourmet all
ate she it well-being all
he exquisite drops only seems
he healthy drops only seems
somewhat lavish I was retired
somewhat natural I was retired
picked throw apples hardly the
picked throw apples hardly the
should now withdraw pleasure we
should now withdraw beneficial we
they obedient him often meet
they obedient him often meet
luxury it hides there over
wholegrain it hides there over
is it fancy plant so
is it pure plant so
send I mail it over
send I mail it over
extravagant alone very are they
nourishing alone very are they
sky the seamless blue is
sky the seamless blue is
food give keep decadent the
food give keep wholesome the
him was indulgent it always
him was hearty it always
Note: Prime words are italicized only for illustration purposes in the table.
Table 3.2
SEQUENCE OF TRIAL BLOCKS IN THE IAT
Block No. of Functions
Items assigned to left-key Items assigned to rightTrials
response
key response
1

10

Practice

Decadent brand names

Wholesome brand names

2

10

Practice

Positive words

Negative words

3(or
6)

20

Test

Positive words +
Decadent brand names

Negative words +
Wholesome brand names

4(or
7)

20

Test

Positive words +
Decadent brand names

Negative words +
Wholesome brand names

5(or
3)

10

Practice

Wholesome brand names

Decadent brand names

6(or
4)

20

Test

Positive words +
Wholesome brand names

Negative words +
Decadent brand names

7

20

Test

Positive words +
Wholesome brand names

Negative words +
Decadent brand names

When a brand name or a word is supposed to be categorized as labels on the right (i.e.,
wholesome and negative), subjects are expected to push “I” on the key board. Next, they are
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asked to categorize the word, either as wholesome or positive (located on left label), or as
decadent or negative (located on right label) (i.e., Task 2). The response times for these
categorization tasks are measured to compute the average response times for these two tasks.
When an individual’s association between decadent (wholesome) brands and positive
(negative) words is stronger than that between decadent (wholesome) brands and negative
(positive) words, we assume that the average response time for Task 1 is shorter than that for
Task 2. Thus, when the average response time for Task 2 minus the average response time for
Task 1 is positive, we can assume that this individual has a preference for decadent brands over
wholesome brands.
Messner and Vosgerau (2009) argued that researchers should take order effects into
consideration in the IAT. In the IAT, two categories (e.g., wholesome and decadent) are paired
with either positive or negative words. For instance, Blocks 3 & 4 have wholesome and positive
on the left and decadent and negative on the right. These pairs are then switched in Blocks 6 & 7,
with decadent and positive on the left and wholesome and negative on the right. Messner and
Vosgerau (2009) argued that the order of this combination affects the response time of this
categorization task. In other words, we can combine decadent and positive (on the left) and
wholesome and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then wholesome and positive (on the
left) and decadent and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 1).
Another alternative is to combine wholesome and positive (on the left) and decadent and
negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then decadent and positive (on the left) and
wholesome and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 2). In
Blocks 6 & 7, a participant learns a new category combination that is inconsistent with that in
Blocks 3 & 4 which, Messner and Vosgerau (2009) argued, results in a slower response time in
Blocks 6 & 7 than in Blocks 3 & 4.

This effect should be observed, regardless of the
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compatibility of the category combination. Thus, the argument goes somewhat against the
previous discussion about the compatible and incompatible tasks. In order to account for such
order effects, we counterbalanced these two types of categorization (i.e., combination 1 and
combination 2).
An implicit attitude will be computed following the algorithm developed by Greenwald,
Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Among the data from seven blocks (see Table 15 for the detail of
each block), the analysis will utilize data only from Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7. First, data considered
as outliers will be eliminated; this would include a trial where the response latency is beyond
10,000 ms or trials where the responses are less than 300ms, accounting for more than 10% of
trials.
The former will be eliminated because one single trial is unlikely to take more than
10,000 ms if a subject is paying full attention to the task. Thus, it is possible that a subject is
engaged in another, unrelated task (e.g., thinking of something else). The latter is eliminated
because trials with less than 300ms latencies are more likely to be considered as random
responses (i.e., not following the instructions).
After this treatment, the mean for correct response latencies for each block will be
calculated. One standard deviation for all trials of Blocks 3 and 6, and another standard deviation
for all trials of Blocks 4 and 7 will be computed. Response latencies for incorrect answers will be
replaced with the block mean (previously computed), plus 600ms. Then, for each block (i.e.,
Blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7), we average the response latencies, including the original latency for correct
responses, as well as the replaced latency for incorrect responses, thus resulting in Mb3 Mb4 Mb6
and Mb7. Then, we compute the differences between Mb6 and Mb3 (Mb6 - Mb3) and between Mb7
and Mb4 (Mb7 - Mb4). Then, we divide each value by its standard deviation, resulting in (Mb6 Mb3) /(SD b6&b3) and (Mb7 - Mb4) /(SD b7&b4). Finally, we average the two values.
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3.4.3.2. Explicit Attitude
For explicit attitude measures, 9-point scales (good vs. bad, like vs. dislike, and favorable
vs. unfavorable) were used to measure explicit attitude for each brand (frugal or luxury).
Subjects evaluated five wholesome brands and five decadent brands, one at a time. Subjects
chose one to indicate an unfavorable attitude (i.e., bad, dislike, unfavorable) and chose nine to
indicate a favorable attitude (i.e., good, like, and favorable). Summated scales for three items
were computed both for wholesome brands and decadent brands. Then a factor score was
computed for the five wholesome brands, resulting in one component. Another factor score was
computed for the five decadent brands, resulting in one component. Finally, the factor score for
wholesome brands was subtracted from the factor score for luxury brands.
3.4.3.3. Preference
Subjects were asked to indicate preference between two brands (one wholesome and
another decadent) in several product categories for ten pairs of brands. Thus, there were ten
decadent brands and ten wholesome brands. As may be seen in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, half of these
brands (i.e., five decadent and five wholesome brands) were the same brands used either in the
explicit attitude measures in Study 2 or the implicit attitude measure in Study 1. The other half of
these brands was only used in the preference task. The latter half of these brands was added to
minimize the order effect between the preference task and the IAT/explicit attitude task, but was
not used in the analysis, except for the order analysis. In the order analysis (see Table 3.8), we
needed to analyze all the brands from the first preference task to the tenth preference task. Thus,
the entire ten pairs of wholesome and decadent brands were used for the analysis.
For five pairs of brands, subjects responded to “1” when they preferred the wholesome
brand, “5” when their preference for two brands was indifferent, or “9” when they preferred the
decadent brand. For the other five pairs of brands, subjects selected “1” when they preferred the
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decadent brand, “5” when their preference for two brands was indifferent, or “9” when they
preferred the wholesome brand. Preference scores for the latter five pairs of brands were
reversed. That is, in the analysis, “1” indicates a preference for frugal brands, while “9” indicates
a preference for decadent brands over frugal brands.
3.4.3.4. Mood
Four items with 9-point scales (irritable vs. pleased, sad vs. happy, depressed vs. cheerful,
and bad mood vs. good mood) were used to measure mood.
3.4.3.5. Trait (Self-control)
We employed a brief version of the self-control trait measures from Tangney, Baumeister,
and Boone (2004). Self-control is “widely regarded as a capacity to change and adapt the self so
as to produce a better, more optimal fit between self and world” (e.g., Rothbaum et al., 1982)
(c.f., Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone, 2004).
3.4.3.6. Cognitive Load
At the end of each study, participants were asked to select the 8-digit number shown in
the beginning of the study (i.e., 89532316) among a list of nine numbers.
3.4.4 Material Pretests
3.4.4.1. Pretest 1: Selecting Brands
A pretest was conducted to choose brands considered to be either decadent or wholesome.
Fifty undergraduate students completed the pretest. One group was asked to evaluate 35
potentially wholesome brands and another group was asked to evaluate 35 potentially decadent
brands. These participants were asked to evaluate each brand in terms of the level of association
with four words: “wholesome,” “decadent,” “familiarity” and “positivity.” For each brand,
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following statements:
(1) ---- is “wholesome”, (2) --- is “decadent,” (3) --- is “familiar,” and (4) Overall, I have a
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positive attitude towards ----. The scale was a 9-point item from 1, strongly disagree to 9,
strongly agree.
Then, ten wholesome brands with means above mid-point in wholesome association
(mean ranged from 6.75 to 7.71), and ten decadent brands with the means at least above the midpoint in decadent association (mean ranged from 5.12 to 6.47) were selected. Repeated measures
ANOVA revealed that wholesome brands were rated as more wholesome (M=7.089) than
decadent brands (M=4.833) (F

1, 50

= 19.570, p < .001, η2 = .281). All brands were relatively

familiar and positive, with the mean above a mid-point of five. Decadent brands selected include
Ben & Jerry’s, Starbucks, Haagen-Dazs, Dove-Chocolate, Coke, and others (Please see Tables
3.3 for the decadent brand names and detailed results). Wholesome brands selected included
Cheerios, V8, Special-K, Nature Valley, Quaker Oats and others. Please see Tables 3.4 for the
wholesome brand names and detailed results.
Table 3.3
Pretest Results: Brand Name Association for Decadent Brands
Decadent Wholesome Familiarity Positive Category
Ben & Jerry’s
6.47
5.97
7.24
7.03
At. and Pref.
Haagen-Dazs
6.26
5.59
5.76
6.06
At. and Pref.
Godiva
6.06
5.24
5.71
6.24
At. and Pref.
Snickers
6.03
5.94
8.35
7.32
At. and Pref.
Pepperidge Farm
5.59
5.88
6.50
6.65
At. and Pref.
Cookie
Wolfgang Puck
5.12
5.06
5.09
5.26
Only Pref.
Starbucks
6.47
6.15
8.24
6.85
Only Pref.
Coke
6.21
6.24
8.71
7.91
Only Pref.
Krispy Kreme
5.53
4.62
7.44
6.00
Only Pref.
Wonka
5.32
5.15
6.76
6.26
Only Pref.
Note: 9 point scale: 1, Strongly Disagree to 9, Strongly Agree. At.: Used in Attitude Measure.
Pref.: Used in Preference Measure.
3.4.4.2. Pretest 2: Generating Prime Words
Another pretest was conducted to generate prime words for the goal manipulation
(wholesome vs. decadent). In Pretest 2, 40 undergraduate students completed a free recall task
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Table 3.4
Pretest Results: Brand Name Association for Wholesome Brands
Wholesome Decadent Familiarity Positive Category
Dannon
6.89
5.36
7.18
7.00
At. and Pref.
Yoplait
6.71
5.36
6.86
7.00
At. and Pref.
Cheerios
7.71
5.25
7.96
7.64
At. and Pref.
Quaker Oats
7.29
4.89
7.50
7.32
At. and Pref.
Fiber One
6.68
5.18
5.96
5.61
At. and Pref.
Healthy Choice
6.89
5.36
6.54
6.36
Only Pref.
V8
7.64
5.79
7.64
7.04
Only Pref.
Dole
6.93
5.57
7.46
7.25
Only Pref.
Kashi
6.61
4.93
5.04
5.68
Only Pref.
Special K
7.54
5.86
7.39
7.25
Only Pref.
Note: 9 point scale: 1, Strongly Disagree to 9, Strongly Agree. At.: Used in Attitude Measure.
Pref.: Used in Preference Measure.
for two given words (i.e., wholesome and decadent). They were asked to list a set of five words
associated with wholesome, as well as another set of five words associated with decadent. We
also selected a series of words from the free association norms database provided by Nelson,
McEvoy and Schreiber (1998). This database provides results from free word association tests
for many words, including healthy, luxury, rich, elegant, and others. We also selected some
synonyms of wholesome and decadent. In this way, we constructed a list of 30 prime words for
wholesome and decadent goals.
3.4.4.3. Pretest 3: Validating Prime Words
In the subsequent Pretest 3, another set of participants, forty-six undergraduate students,
evaluated the prime words, generated in Pretest 2, on its valence and on its strength of
association with either “wholesome” or “decadent.” Finally, we have selected ten prime words
for each “wholesome” and “decadent” goal prime. The prime words for the “decadent” goal
included luxury, rich, lavish, fancy, extravagant, exquisite, indulgent, pleasure, gourmet, and
sophisticated. The participants rated these prime words as associated with “decadent,” with the
means ranging from 6.28 to 6.83 on a 9-point scale (1, Not at all associated with "Decadent" to 9,
84

Strongly associated with "Decadent"). The ten prime words were rated as positive with the
means ranging from 6.5 to 8 on a 9 point scale (1, negative to 9, positive). Please see Table 3.5
for the detail.
Table 3.5
PRIME WORDS FOR DECADENT GOAL (N=46)
Prime Words
Mean *
Standard Error
Luxury
6.83
0.28
Rich
6.70
0.32
Lavish
6.70
0.28
Fancy
6.67
0.25
Extravagant
6.67
0.27
Exquisite
6.65
0.27
Indulgent
6.52
0.31
Pleasure
6.46
0.24
Gourmet
6.41
0.32
Sophisticated
6.28
0.32
Note: * 9 point scale (1: Not at all associated with Decadent,
Decadent)

Valence
7.41
7.04
6.50
6.78
6.67
7.80
6.17
8.00
7.39
7.33
9: Strongly associated with

The prime words for wholesome were nutritious, healthy, hearty, nourishing, wholegrain,
well-being, natural, pure, beneficial, and well-rounded. The participants rated these primes words
as relatively associated with “wholesome,” with means ranging from 3.52 to 2.50 on a 9 point
scale (1, strongly associated with "Wholesome," to 9, not at all associated with "Wholesome."
The ten prime words were rated as positive with the means ranging from 7.00 to 8.26 on a 9point scale (1, negative to 9, positive). Please see Table 3.6 for the detail. Repeated measures
ANOVA revealed that decadent prime words were rated more decadent (M=6.589) than
wholesome prime words (M=3.035) (F 1, 45 = 168.506, p < .001, η2 = .789).
3.4.5. Procedures
A few days before the main study, subjects completed an online study about their traits,
including self-control trait. Then, they engaged in a series of tasks in a computer lab. The study
was administered with E-prime software, thus allowing a collection of response times. First,
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subjects completed a mood manipulation task. After completing the task, subjects were asked to
indicate how this task made them feel (1 = very unhappy to 9 = very happy). Second, all subjects
were given a high cognitive load task. Third, subjects completed the scrambled sentence task that
worked as supraliminal primes. Fourth, subjects engaged in preference tasks. Next, subjects
answered either explicit attitude measures (in Study 2) or implicit attitude measures (Study 1).
Table 3.6
PRIME WORDS FOR WHOLESOME GOAL (N=46)
Prime Words
Mean *2
Standard Error
Valence
Nutritious
2.5
0.17
8.17
Healthy
2.54
0.21
8.26
Hearty
2.76
0.26
7.30
Nourishing
2.83
0.23
7.98
Wholegrain
3.17
0.23
7.00
Well-being
3.22
0.23
7.72
Natural
3.24
0.22
7.63
Pure
3.26
0.26
7.85
Beneficial
3.3
0.23
7.89
Well-rounded
3.52
0.25
7.65
Note:* 9 point scale (1: Strongly associated with Wholesome, 9: Not at all associated with
Wholesome), Valence: 9 point scale (1: Negative, 9: Positive)
We used five pairs of brands (five wholesome and five decadent brands) in both attitude
and preference measures. In order to minimize the order effects (attitude and preference), the
preference measure also included another five pairs of brands (five wholesome and five decadent
brands), not used in attitude measure (i.e., non-target brands). Then, subjects were asked to recall
the eight-digit number that they were asked to remember in the beginning of the study.
3.5. ANALYSIS
3.5.1. Preliminary Checks
3.5.1.1. Reliability
The four-item, 9-point scale, was used to measure how the description of happy events
made respondents feel (1, very unhappy to 9, very happy). Cronbach's Alphas were .927 for
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Study 1, and .966 for Study 2. Also, thirteen items with a 9-point scale were used to measure
self-control (1=less self-control to 9=more self-control). Cronbach's Alphas were .880 for Study
1 and .784 for Study 2.
3.5.1.2. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 1)
Participants who described a happy event reported a significantly more positive mood (M
= 6.588) than those who described an unhappy event (M = 3.715) (F

64

= 63.107, p < .001, η2

= .496). The goal prime manipulation did not have a significant effect on the mood measure (F 64
= 1.408, p =.240, η2 = .022).
The trait measure (i.e., self-control) was measured prior to the main study. The goal
prime had no significant effect on the self-control measure (F

64

= 2.823, p =.098, η2 = .042).

Neither did the mood manipulation have a significant effect on self-control (F 64 = .034, p =.855,
η2 = .001). Also, sixty among sixty-eight participants correctly recognized the number (i.e.,
89532316) shown in the beginning of the study.
3.5.1.3. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 2)
Participants who described a happy event reported a significantly more positive mood (M
= 6.485) than those who described an unhappy event (M = 3.287) (F

62

= 71.785, p < .001, η2

= .537). However, as expected, the goal prime manipulation did not have a significant effect on
the mood measure (F

62

= .332, p =.566, η2 = .005). Similarly, the goal prime manipulation had

no significant effect on the mood measure (F 62 = 1.233, p =.271, η2 = .019).
Again, the trait measure (i.e., self-control) was measured prior to the main study. The
goal prime did not have a significant effect on self-control (F

62

= 1.949, p =.168, η2 = .030).

Neither did the mood manipulation have a significant effect on self-control (F 62 = .113, p =.738,
η2 = .002). Also, fifty-nine among sixty-six participants correctly recognized the number (i.e.,
89532316) shown in the beginning of the study.
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3.5.1.4. Outlier Analysis
In Study 1, no subjects reported a connection between the goal manipulation and the
preference, or the IAT tasks. In Study 2, two of the sixty-eight subjects reported a connection
between the goal manipulation and the preference or explicit attitude tasks. To avoid any
possibility that the goal was consciously activated, these subjects were removed from the
analysis. Thus, the analysis for Study 2 was conducted with sixty-six subjects.
3.5.2. Study 1 & Study 2 (Preference)
3.5.2.1. Hypothesis 1: Goal Prime on Preference
An analysis of variance was conducted to assess the effect of mood and goal prime on
preference. Preference was a common measure in Study 1 and Study 2. There were no significant
differences between Studies 1 and 2 on preference: no main effect of study (F

1, 125

= 2.496, p

= .117, η2 = .020) and no interaction effects (p > .05). Thus, the data were collapsed. The
dependent variable was preference for the decadent brand compared to the wholesome brand. In
the analysis, prior to forming a factor score, 1 indicates a preference for frugal brands, and 9
indicates a preference for decadent brands on a 9-point scale.
These preference scores for five pairs of brands (i.e., five wholesome brands and five
decadent brands) were used to compute a factor score. In the computed factor score, a negative
score indicates preference for the wholesome brands; 0 indicates indifferent preference between
the wholesome and the decadent brands; and a positive score indicates preference for the
decadent brands. The between-subject factors were mood (positive vs. negative) and goal prime
(decadent vs. wholesome). Self-control was used as covariate. Please see Table 3.7 for the
ANOVA results. The main effect of goal prime on preference was significant (M = .158 for the
decadent goal prime and M= -.027 for the wholesome goal prime) (F
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1, 125

= 6.274, p = .014, η2

= .048), supporting H1. The main effect of mood on preference was not significant (F 1, 125 = .324,
p = .570, η2 = .003). Please see Figure 3.5 for the result.
Table 3.7
ANOVA RESULTS ON PREFERENCE
(STUDIES 1 & 2) (N = 134)
df
Trait (Self-control)
1
Mood
1
Goal
1
Study
1
Mood x Goal
1
Mood x Study
1
Goal x Study
1
Mood x Goal x Study
1
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.

F
3.191
.324
6.274
2.496
1.338
.189
.072
.355

p-value
.076
.570
.014
.117
.250
.664
.788
.552

η2
.025
.003
.048
.020
.011
.002
.001
.003

Figure 3.5
ACTUAL FOR H1 (STUDIES 1 & 2)
The two-way interaction between mood and goal prime on preference was not significant
(F 1, 125 = 1.338, p = .250, η2 = .011). However, further analysis revealed that in a negative mood,
an individual with a decadent goal prime preferred decadent brands (M = .206), while an
individual with a wholesome goal prime preferred wholesome brands (M = -.416) (F 1, 60 = 6.999,
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p = .010, η2 = .104). However, in a positive mood, the means were not statistically different (F 1,
64

= .720, p = .399, η2 = .011). Further analysis revealed that preference toward decadent brands

over wholesome brands was indifferent to mood, either under the decadent goal prime (F
= .130, p = .720, η2 = .002) or under the wholesome goal prime (F

1, 65

1, 59

= 1.711, p = .195, η2

= .026). Please see Figure 3.6 for the result.
3.5.2.2. Hypothesis 2: Goal and Brand Order on Preference
Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of brand order, mood,
and goal prime on preference. In the order analysis, we needed to analyze all the brands from the
first preference task to the tenth preference task. Thus, all ten pairs of wholesome and decadent
brands were used for the analysis, whereas only five pairs of wholesome and decadent brands,
common either in explicit or implicit attitude measures, were used in the other analysis (e.g.,
testing H1). In the analysis, 1 indicates a preference for frugal brands, while 9 indicates a
preference for decadent brands, using a 9-point scale. A factor score was not computed in this
order analysis.

Figure 3.6
MOOD X GOAL ON PREFERENCE (STUDY 1 & 2)

90

The following interactions, as the primary interests of this analysis, were not significant;
that is, between brand order and study (Study 1 vs. Study 2) (F 1, 125 = .669, p = .415, η2 = .005),
between goal prime and study (F 1, 125 = .024, p = .877, η2 = .000), and among goal prime, study,
and brand order (F 1, 125 = .836, p = .362, η2 = .007). Thus, although the main effect of study on
preference was significant (F 1, 125 = 6.598, p = .011, η2 = .050), the data for Study 1 and Study 2
were collapsed in this analysis.
As expected, an individual with a decadent goal prime (M=5.813) preferred toward
decadent brands to wholesome brands more than an individual with a wholesome goal prime
(M=5.268) (F

1, 125

= 5.890, p = .017, η2 = .045). However, the two way interaction of brand

order and goal prime on preference was not significant (F 1, 125 = .669, p = .415, η2 = .005). This
may be an indication that the prime words are activating a goal rather than prime-related
associative cues, supporting H2a and rejecting H2b. As the interaction between goal prime and
mood on preference (F 1, 125 = .701, p = .404, η2 = .006), and the interaction between brand order,
goal prime, and mood on preference (F 1, 125 = .533, p = .467, η2 = .004) were not significant, the
main effect of goal and the interaction of goal and brand order on preference should be
unaffected by mood. Please see Figure 3.7 and Table 3.8 for the result.

Figure 3.7
ACTUAL FOR H2
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3.5.3. Study 1
3.5.3.1. Hypotheses 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, and 7
Path analysis, a form of general linear model (Karlin, Cameron, Chakraborty, 1983), was
conducted to simultaneously assess the effect of mood, category combination, and goal on
implicit attitude and preference (Please see Figure 3.8). Please see Graham 2008 for the use of
categorical data in the general linear model. The analysis revealed that goal prime (1 =
wholesome and 2 = decadent) positively and significantly affected implicit attitude toward
decadent brands over wholesome brands (β = .231, p=.028), supporting H4a. The direct effect of
goal prime on preference was not statistically significant (β = .174, p = .134), supporting H3a. As
expected, implicit attitude positively affected preference (β = .279, p=.016), supporting H5a.
Table 3.8
Repeated Measures of ANOVA Results on Preference for Brand Order Analysis
(Study 1 & 2) (N = 134)
df
F
p-value
η2
Brand Order
1
.932
.336
.007
Brand Order x Trait (Self- 1
1.028
.313
.008
control)
Brand Order x Mood
1
1.023
.314
.008
Brand Order x Goal
1
.669
.415
.005
Brand Order x Study
1
.791
.376
.006
Brand Order x Mood x 1
.533
.467
.004
Goal
Brand Order x Mood x 1
.763
.384
.006
Study
Brand Order x Goal x 1
.836
.362
.007
Study
Brand Order x Mood x 1
.866
.354
.007
Goal x Study
Trait (Self-control)
1
4.979
.027
.038
Mood
1
.051
.821
.000
Goal
1
5.890
.017
.045
Study
1
6.598
.011
.050
Mood x Goal
1
.701
.404
.006
Mood x Study
1
1.587
.210
.013
Goal x Study
1
.024
.877
.000
Mood x Goal x Study
1
.103
.749
.001
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.
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Further path analysis revealed that mood was not a good predictor of either implicit attitude (β
= .057, p=.586) or preference (β = -.129, p=.256), rejecting H6a and H7. (Please see Figure 3.8
for the result.)
Mood
-.129
.057
Category
Combination

-.447*

Implicit Attitude

.279*
Preference

.231*
.174
Supraliminal Goal
Prime

Figure 3.8
PATH MODEL (ACTUAL FOR STUDY 1)
3.5.3.2. Hypothesis 8
Path analysis revealed that a category combination (1=combination 1; 2=combination 2)
is negatively associated with implicit attitude (β = -.447, p<.001), supporting H8. This is an
indication that combination 1 resulted in a better implicit attitude toward decadent brands than
for combination 2. A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to confirm the effect of a
category combination on implicit attitude (Please see Table 16 for the results).
A category combination affects implicit attitude, where consumers had more positive
attitudes toward wholesome brands in combination 1 (M = .072) and more positive attitudes
toward decadent brands in combination 2 (M = -.547) (F

1, 59

= 15.942, p <.001, η2 = .213),

confirming H8. Please see Figure 3.8 and Table 3.9. Since a category combination had no
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significant interactions with the goal (F 1, 59 = .312, p = .579, η2 = .005), or mood (F 1, 59 = 2.191,
p =.144, η2 = .036), the effect of category combination on implicit attitude was consistent
regardless of mood or goal. Please see Table 3.9.

Mood
-.049
.045

Explicit Attitude

.726*
Preference

.105
.122
Supraliminal Goal
Prime
Figure 3.9
PATH MODEL (ACTUAL FOR STUDY 2)
3.5.4. Study 2
3.5.4.1. Hypotheses 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7
Path analysis was conducted to simultaneously assess the effect of mood and goal on
explicit attitude and preference. The analysis revealed that the goal prime had no significant
effect on explicit attitude (β = .105, p = .395), supporting H4b. Goal prime had no significant
effect on preference (β = .122, p = .139), rejecting H3b. Explicit attitude was a good predictor of
preference (β = .726, p <.001), supporting H5b. Although we have predicted that implicit attitude
has a stronger relationship with preference than explicit attitude, this was not supported.
Comparison of standardized regression weights reveals that explicit attitude has a stronger
relationship (β =.726, p <.001) with preference than implicit attitude (β = .279, p <.001),
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rejecting H5c. Mood was not a good predictor of either explicit attitude (β = .045, p = 712) or
preference (β = -.049, p = .549), rejecting both H6b and H7. Please see Figure 3.9 and Table 3.10
for the result.
Table 3.9
MANOVA RESULTS FOR STUDY 1
df
Preference (Dependent Variable)
Trait(Self-control)
Mood
Goal
Category Combination
Mood x Goal
Mood x Category Combination
Goal x Category Combination
Mood x Goal x Category Combination
Implicit Attitude (Dependent Variable)
Trait(Self-control)
Mood
Goal
Category Combination
Mood x Goal
Mood x Category Combination
Goal x Category Combination
Mood x Goal x Category Combination
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.

F

p-value

η2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1.224
.831
2.884
.103
2.406
2.206
1.575
.227

.273
.366
.095
.749
.126
.143
.214
.635

.020
.014
.047
.002
.039
.036
.026
.004

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.003
.237
4.511
15.942
.129
2.191
.312
.156

.957
.628
.038
.000
.720
.144
.579
.695

.000
.004
.071
.213
.002
.036
.005
.003

3.6 Discussion
3.6.1. Hypothesis 1
As we have predicted, consumers preferred brands consistent with the goal prime.
Although the interaction of mood and goal prime on preference was not significant, there was a
slight goal-approach tendency in a negative mood, implied by the significant main effect of the
goal prime (F 1, 125 = 6.999, p = .010, η2 = .104) in a negative mood (M=.206 for decadent prime;
M=-.416 for wholesome prime), but not in a positive mood, (F 1, 125 = .720, p = .399, η2 = .011).
This approach tendency of negative mood is consistent with the notion that negative emotion
(e.g., anger) facilitates goal-approach tendencies, rather than goal-avoidance tendencies (e.g.,
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Aarts, Custers, and Holland, 2007, p. 176, Carver, 2004). Please see Table 3.10 for the
MANOVA results.
These findings conflict with some studies (e.g., Fishbach and Labroo, 2007) that suggest
an individual in a positive mood tends to approach the goal while an individual in a negative
mood tends to avoid the goal. Thus, under high cognitive load, where opportunity is low, an
individual in a positive mood should approach the goal, resulting in goal-consistent behavior. In
contrast, an individual in a negative mood should avoid the goal, and thus brand preference is not
affected by the goal prime. Results from Essay 2 support this argument (Please see 3.6.9.
General Discussion for explanation of these seemingly conflicting results).
Table 3.10
MANOVA RESULTS FOR STUDY 2
df
Preference (Dependent Variable)
Trait(Self-control)
1
Mood
1
Goal
1
Mood x Goal
1
Explicit Attitude (Dependent
Variable)
Trait(Self-control)
Mood
Goal
Mood x Goal
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.

1
1
1
1

p-value

η2

1.860
.005
3.312
.191

.178
.944
.074
.664

.030
.000
.051
.003

.958
.166
.989
.187

.332
.685
.324
.667

.015
.003
.016
.003

F

3.6.2. Hypothesis 2
The effect of the goal prime on preference was indifferent to brand order. If the goal
prime was merely triggering semantic activation, the effect of the goal prime should diminish
after exposure to a prime (Higgins, 1996). Thus, the results suggest that the prime was activating
a goal. This is because an activated goal (e.g., hunger) is believed to maintain its effect until it is
fulfilled (e.g., by eating lunch) (Aarts, Gollwitzer, and Hassin, 2004). In order to clearly
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understand this possible diminishing effect of semantic activation, some researchers include filler
tasks after the goal manipulation, yet before subjects engage in the behavioral task (e.g., choice
task or preference task).
3.6.3. Hypotheses 3a, 4a, and 5a
The path analysis supported H3a, H4a and H5a. This indicates that goal consistent
preference was mediated by implicit attitude. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
that empirically found that the goal consistent preference is mediated by implicit attitude, using
the IAT in a consumer consumption context. Some researchers may argue that the goal prime
was merely activating semantic cues, resulting in mediation by implicit attitude and primeconsistent preference. However, the empirical support for H2a (goal activation) instead of H2b
(semantic activation) rejects this explanation.
The mediating role of implicit attitude on prime-consistent preference is well explained
by the goal system theory. As the goal system theory indicates, semantic activation and goal
activation may not differ from each other. If goals, subordinate-goals, and their means are
represented similarly to semantic cues in memory, a goal prime may activate a goal and
associated cues, resulting in prime-consistent implicit attitude and prime-consistent preference.
Thus, there is no direct effect of goal prime on preference, thus supporting H3a.
If semantic construct activation is “passive with no motivational properties” (Bargh et el.
2001, Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001, c.f., Sela and Shiv, 2009), where cognitive systems and
motivational systems are considered two distinct systems, successful goal activation should not
be mediated by implicit attitude. In such a case, goal activation by the goal prime should directly
lead to a prime-consistent preference with no effect on either implicit or explicit attitudes.
Supporting H3a with no direct effect of the goal prime on implicit attitude rejects the view that
motivation and cognitive systems are two different systems.
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3.6.4. Hypotheses 6a and 7
Neither H6a nor H7 was supported. We predicted that an individual in a negative mood
lacks self-control, resulting in preference toward immediate rewards (e.g., try to feel better by
eating tasty, but unhealthy, decadent food) rather than long-term rewards (e.g., staying fit and
healthy). However, the main effect of mood on implicit attitude and preference was not observed
in our study.
It may be the case that the goal of maintaining or improving mood was not accessible;
thus, an individual in a negative mood would not feel better by prioritizing immediate rewards
over long-term rewards. Instead, subjects approached a given goal prime, resulting in goal
consistent attitude or goal consistent preference, regardless of mood. This finding is somewhat
consistent with Fishbach and Labroo (2007).
3.6.5. Hypothesis 8
As noted, the means for implicit attitude in IAT combination 1 and in IAT combination 2
were .072 and -.542, respectively. For combination 1, decadent and positive (categories on the
left), wholesome and negative (categories on the right) combination was administered first in
Steps 3 & 4, and switched later in Steps 6 & 7. In combination 2, wholesome and positive
(categories on the left), decadent and negative (categories on the right) combination administered
first in Steps 3 & 4, and switched later in Steps 6 & 7. This support of H8 indicates that IAT
combination 1 resulted in a better implicit attitude toward decadent brands over wholesome
brands than IAT combination 2.
These findings are consistent with Messner and Vosgerau’s (2010) argument that it
requires effort for an individual to learn a new category combination in Steps 6 & 7, one
different from a previously learned category combination in Steps 3 & 4. Thus in the IAT,
response times for Steps 6 & 7 should be consistently longer than for Steps 3 & 4. Consistent
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with Messner and Vosgerau (2010), subjects preferred decadent brands in combination 1, and
wholesome brands in combination 2.
While the mean of implicit attitude for combination 1 was positive (i.e., .072), the mean
of implicit attitude for combination 2 was negative (i.e., -.542). While the positive number
suggests a more favorable implicit attitude toward the decadent brand over the wholesome brand,
the negative number suggests a more favorable attitude toward wholesome brands over a
decadent brand. Thus, it is important to counterbalance the combination of categories in the IAT.
3.6.6. Hypotheses 3b, 4b, and 5b
In path analysis, the direct effect of the supraliminal goal prime on preference was not
significant, rejecting H3b. However, the MANOVA revealed that a goal prime had a significant
goal consistent effect on preference (P=.0371). This suggests that the combination of the direct
effect, and the indirect effect through implicit attitude, of goal prime on preference was
significant. As expected, the goal prime did not have a significant effect on explicit attitude, thus
supporting H4b. Also, as expected, an explicit attitude had a positive and significant effect on
preference, thus supporting H5b. Therefore, the effect of goal prime on preference was not
mediated by an explicit attitude.
Although we predicted that under high-cognitive load, an implicit attitude would be a
better predictor than explicit attitude, this was not the case. Both explicit and implicit attitudes
were good predictors of preference. Yet unexpectedly, explicit attitude had a stronger
relationship with preference than implicit attitude. These results, in conjunction with those for
H3a, H4a, and H5a, imply that a non-conscious goal prime may be mediated by implicit attitude,
but not by explicit attitude. This result is consistent with Ferguson and Bargh (2004)’s argument

1

*1: As we have predicted the direction of the effect of goal prime on preference, the p-value is
computed as one-tailed.
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that although an activation of goal would affect implicit attitude uniquely, that activation does
not affect explicit attitude.
3.6.7. Hypotheses 6b, 7
Similar to Study 1, mood was not a good predictor of either explicit attitude or preference,
rejecting both H6b and H7. Again, this might be an indication that when a goal already exists
(i.e., wholesome or decadent goals), an individual in a negative mood may not have an accessible
goal toward improving the mood by favoring immediate rewards (e.g., eating tasty, decadent
food) to long-term rewards (e.g., staying fit and healthy). Thus, the main effect of mood on
preference or explicit attitude is due to a lack of self-control in a negative mood.
3.6.8. Implication (Studies 1 & 2)
The results from Studies 1 and 2 indicate that the goal activation explanation was
supported, rejecting the semantic-cue activation explanation. Also, interestingly, implicit attitude
was a better mediator of the relationship between goal prime and preference than explicit attitude.
These findings have important theoretical implications.
The consistent goal priming effect on preference did not diminish over time, which
means that the prime activated the goal, not just semantic cues, resulting in a preference
consistent with goal prime. This is because the effect of semantic cue activation may decay
quickly over time, whereas the effect of goal activation should not diminish until fulfilled.
Interestingly, the goal prime had a significant effect not only on preference, but also on
implicit attitude. Then the implicit attitude had a positive, significant effect on preference. Thus,
the effect of goal prime on preference was mediated by the implicit attitude. This is consistent
with the theory of goal systems where goals and motivation are part of the cognitive systems
rather than distinct from them. If the goal is not part of the cognitive systems, as other
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researchers argue, the effect of goal prime on preference would not have been mediated by
implicit attitude.
However, there was no effect of the goal prime on explicit attitude. As some studies
indicate that goal activation has more impact on implicit attitude than on explicit attitude
(Ferguson, 2008; Ferguson and Bargh, 2004), a consideration of explicit attitude alone may lead
researchers to underestimate the effects of goal primes. The results of this study highlight the
importance of including implicit attitude measures, such as the IAT, to capture the effect of goal
prime on behavioral outcomes, such as brand preference.
The study also has an important methodological implication on the use of the IAT.
Support for H8 indicates that the category combination has a significant effect on implicit
attitude. This result is important when the direction of preference depends on the category
combination; in this study, one category combination resulted in preference towards decadent
brands, while the other category combination resulted in a preference for wholesome brands
(M=.072 for combination 1 and M = -.547 for combination 2). If a researcher applies only one
category combination, the results might be misinterpreted, which confirms the argument by
Messner and Vosgerau (2010).
3.6.9. General Discussion (Essay 2 & Essay 3)
3.6.9.1. Introduction
This dissertation has two primary purposes: (1) to understand how goal primes affect
preference, and (2) to understand the moderators and mediators of the effect of goal prime on
preference. As Custers and Arts (2007) pointed out, we do not have a clear understanding of
how goal primes affect behavioral outcomes. Chartland et al. (2008) and Sela and Shiv (2009)
provided the latest attempt in marketing literature to understand such mechanisms. Closely
following the goal manipulation method used in Chartland et al. (2008), we measured the direct
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effects of goal prime on implicit attitude (IAT) and explicit attitude. As far as we know, this
dissertation is the first attempt to measure implicit attitude (IAT) and explicit attitude as
mediators of the relationship between goal prime and preference in a brand preference context.
Also, research suggests that the goal prime facilitates a choice that is either consistent or
inconsistent with goal prime (Laran, Janiszewski, and Cunha Jr., 2008). This dissertation
confirms the latter finding by (1) identifying moderators of this relationship (i.e., mood and
cognitive load) in the context of frugal vs. luxury brand preference; and (2) identifying context
differences as other moderating factors (i.e., the context of luxury brand vs. frugal brand
preference, vs. the context of wholesome vs. decadent brand preference).
3.6.9.2. The Effect of Goal Prime on Preference
Consumers have not always preferred brands consistent with the goal prime in the
context of luxury vs. frugal brands (i.e., Essay 2). In Essay 2, the effect of goal prime on
preference was moderated by mood and cognitive load. Also, in Essay 2, the effect of goal prime
on preference was more pronounced under a high cognitive load and a positive mood.
This finding is consistent with the MODE model, which suggests that one’s behavior is
guided more by relatively automatic process under low opportunity (e.g., high cognitive load)
than under high opportunity (e.g., low cognitive load) (Fazio, 1990). Thus, the effect of a nonconscious goal prime on preference is more pronounced under a high cognitive load. Also, the
interaction between mood and goal is explained by the goal approach tendency in a positive
mood and the goal-avoidance tendency in a negative mood (Fishbach and Labroo, 2007).
In Essay 3, however, consumers preferred brands consistent with the goal prime,
regardless of mood, in the context of consuming wholesome vs. decadent brands. Although the
interaction of mood and goal was not statistically significant, the effect of goal prime on
preference was relatively more pronounced in a negative mood.
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There are two potential explanations for the inconsistency between Essay 2 and Essay 3.
One possibility is the difference in the context. Laran, Janiszewski, and Cunha Jr. (2008) noted
that the possibility of more prime-inconsistent behavior in uncommon behavioral contexts, rather
than in common behavioral contexts. For student subjects, the context of consuming luxury vs.
frugal brands in Essay 2 was more uncommon than that of consuming decadent vs. wholesome
brands in Essay 3. For example, the purchase of luxury brands (e.g., BMW) may have been an
uncommon behavioral context. Instead, the product categories used in Essay 3 were in more
common behavioral contexts. Thus, the possibility of activating information inconsistent with the
goal prime is more pronounced in Essay 2 than in Essay 3, leaving more room to be moderated
by mood.
Another explanation is the role of mood in goal-approach and goal-avoidance tendencies.
“Certain negative emotions may encourage rather than discourage goal pursuit” (see Aarts,
Custers, and Holland, 2007, p. 176). Although the interaction of mood and goal was not
statistically significant, as seen in Figure 6, the effect of the goal prime on preference was
slightly more pronounced in a negative mood than in positive mood. The finding that negative
mood, instead of positive mood, encouraged goal pursuit in Essay 3, is consistent with the notion
that negative mood has more complex effects than positive mood (Isen, 1984; Leith and
Baumeister, 1996).
3.6.9.3. The Mediating Role of Explicit Attitude and Implicit Attitude
Both in Essay 2 and Essay 3, goal primes affected implicit attitude, but did not affect
explicit attitude. In Essay 2, whereas the effect of goal prime on implicit attitude was moderated
by mood and cognitive load, the effect of goal prime on explicit attitude had no effect on explicit
attitude. In Essay 3 under a high load, the effect of goal prime on preference, as expected, was
mediated by implicit attitude, but not by explicit attitude.
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3.6.9.4. Goal Activation vs. Semantic Cue Activation
In both Essay 2 and Essay 3, the data suggests that primes activate goals, rather than
semantic cues. The goal activation explanation was supported by the maintained, and
undiminished, goal prime effect on preference overtime. Consistent with the theory of goal
systems, these results suggest that goal activation accompanies activation of goal-related cue
activation. According to Kruglanski et al. (2002), “the cognitive properties of goal-systems set
the constraints within which the motivational properties may express themselves.” Thus,
Kruglanski et al. (2002) explains goal-systems as characterized by both cognitive and
motivational properties. After all, goal activation and semantic cue activation may not conflict
with each other. Goal activation may be initiated by semantic cue activation of goal related
concepts (These concepts probably have no motivational property). As a result, semantic
activation may lead to activation of the means needed to attain the goal.
Research suggests that the effect of goals is better captured by implicit attitude rather
than explicit attitude. If researchers investigate the impact of goal activation only on explicit
attitude, researchers may be unable to fully capture the impact of goals on attitudes. The
distinction between explicit and implicit attitude may be why some researchers consider
motivational properties and cognitive properties to be two separate systems.
From a managerial perspective, brands should be recognized as means to achieve goals.
For instance, if an ad can activate a brand that is seen as instrumental to the goal, the brand
activation may lead to goal activation. In that case, the goal may not diminish until the individual
purchases the brand.
3.6.9.5. The Role of Mood on Implicit/Explicit Attitude and Preference
We have predicted that individuals in a negative mood (vs. a positive mood) lack selfcontrol, thus preferring either luxury brands (vs. frugal brands) or decadent brands (vs.
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wholesome brands). Although this should result in the main effect of mood on preference, the
main effect of mood on preference was not observed in these data. In Essay 2, mood was a
moderator of the goal prime effect on preference. Under a high cognitive load, a positive mood
facilitated goal-approach tendencies and a negative mood facilitated goal-avoidance tendencies.
In Essay 3, preference was not affected by mood nor by the interaction between mood and the
goal prime. However, the goal prime did have a main effect on preference. Thus, in Essay 2, the
interaction between the goal prime and mood affected preference. In Essay 3 only the goal prime,
not mood, had an effect on preference.
Both in Essay 2 and Essay 3, the main effect of mood on preference, due to lack of selfcontrol, was not observed. As noted, an individual in a negative mood prioritizes immediate
rewards (e.g., buying luxury brands to make himself/herself feel better) rather than long-term
benefits (e.g., saving money by buying frugal brands), more so than an individual in a positive
mood (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). The current goal may be overridden by a new
prime. This may illustrate a potentially powerful effect of goal primes on preference or other
behavioral outcomes.
3.6.9.6. Implication for the MODE Model
The assumption of the MODE model that priming activates only strongly held attitudes
has been questioned by researchers, who argue that all attitudes are activated automatically
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Our findings in Essay 2 and Essay 3 are consistent with this notion
that the prime can activate both strong and weak attitudes automatically. In Essay 2, the effects
of goal prime on both preference and implicit attitude were not moderated by materialism.
However, they were moderated by cognitive load and mood. Whereas individuals with high
materialism may have strongly held attitudes towards luxury vs. frugal brands, those with low
materialism may have weakly held attitudes toward those brands. Thus, the goal prime
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automatically activates an implicit attitude, regardless of materialism or the strength of implicit
attitudes.
In Essay 3, we used self-control (trait) only as a covariate. Therefore, we did not directly
test whether the effect of goal prime on either preference or implicit attitude was moderated by
trait or attitude strength. However, the goal prime had main effects on both preference and
implicit attitudes. Our findings from both Essay 2 and Essay 3 potentially indicate that the goal
prime can automatically activate both strong and weak attitudes.
3.6.10. Limitations and Future Research (Essay 2 & Essay 3)
3.6.10.1. Issues with IAT
Although the IAT is the most popular measure of implicit attitude today, some
researchers raise issues with the IAT (e.g., Messner and Vosgerau, 2010; Jaccard and Blanton,
2007). Consistent with the findings of Messner and Vosgerau (2010), we discussed the effect of
category combinations on IAT scores. Jaccard and Blanton (2007) questioned the assumptions
underlying the IAT. One such assumption is that the IAT requires a comparison of attitudes
towards two objects (i.e., relative attitudes), with bipolar relationships. However, this may not be
true. In our study, we used wholesome vs. decadent, and frugal vs. luxury. We do not know if
these two categories are conceptually bipolar. Researchers may be able to pretest the cognitive
structure of potential categories by constructing a cognitive mapping. Another solution may be
the use of a single category IAT (Steinman and Karpinski, 2008).
Furthermore, the IAT is a relatively complicated task. Typically, the IAT has seven steps
with ten to twenty brand names or words to categorize for each step; thus, there are about 120
words to categorize in total. For some participants, this might present a tiring task that may
induce a negative mood or increase cognitive load. Some researchers have developed a single
category IAT (e.g., Steinman and Karpinski, 2008), which may be less susceptible to these
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effects. Nevertheless, both formats should be empirically tested for validity and reliability (e.g.,
potential confounds with mood and cognitive load).
3.6.10.2. Mood Manipulation
As is always the challenge for mood research, mood is transient in nature. Thus, a mood
induced at the beginning of a study may regress toward the mean toward the end of the study. In
order to overcome this challenge, researchers may need to use multiple mood manipulations
throughout the study, or measure mood constantly throughout the study by using some
physiological measures (e.g., heart rate, skin temperature). Thus, it might be possible to account
for the transient effects of mood on attitude and preference.
Furthermore, in the mood manipulation, participants were asked to recall happy or
unhappy events. Some happy events may induce more (or less) mood arousal than others.
Although we have only measured the valence of mood, the arousal of mood may present another
crucial dimension. Some research suggests that a positive mood with high arousal reduces selfregulation (Fedorikhin and Patrick, 2008). Thus, it may be interesting to investigate the effect of
both valence and arousal of mood on brand preference in the context of non-conscious goal
activation.
3.6.10.3. Stimulus (Brands)
We have used brands in multiple product categories in measuring preference and
implicit/explicit attitude. This was partly because of a limited number of brands available in a
single product category, containing both wholesome and decadent brands, or luxury and frugal
brands. The IAT typically requires five or more brands in each category (wholesome and
decadent, or luxury and frugal). It may be possible to use not only verbal information (i.e., brand
name) but also visual information (i.e., pictures of brands) to minimize the number of brands
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required. Further, combining both the verbal and visual stimulus in the IAT might increase the
generalizability of the findings.
3.6.10.4. Order Effects
Throughout the studies, we observed many types of order effects. First, the order of
administering dependent measures (i.e., explicit attitude, implicit attitude, and preference) had
some effects. This may be due to the transient nature of mood. Alternatively, some of the
dependent measures themselves may have affected other measures. For instance, the IAT has
many brands (e.g., frugal vs. luxury brands) within its measures. These brands might have
triggered goals and affected either explicit attitude or preference. However, in view of an equal
number of frugal and luxury brands, this consideration should not work as a serious confound in
the study.
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APPENDIX I
DETAILED PRETEST RESULTS: LUXURY BRAND NAMES
Brand Name

Luxury or Frugal*

Familiarity

Saks Fifth Avenue
1.61
Nordstrom
2.92
Four Seasons
2.89
Ritz-Carlton
1.27
BMW
1.55
Hyatt
3.69
Armani
1.50
Lexus
1.71
Continental
4.81
Hertz
5.40
Avis
5.39
Apple
2.65
Bose
2.61
Gucci
1.40
Harvard
1.56
Yale
1.56
Delta
4.60
* 9 point scale with 1 (luxury) and 9 (frugal)

6.39
5.90
6.15
6.68
7.87
6.15
6.35
7.31
6.24
6.06
4.94
7.55
6.79
6.63
6.56
6.45
6.68
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Employed in Main
Study?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

APPENDIX II
DETAILED PRETEST RESULTS: FRUGAL BRAND NAMES
Brand Name

Luxury or Frugal

Familiarity

Wal-Mart
7.68
Dollar General
8.52
Kia
7.11
Motel 6
8.50
Best Western
6.98
Days Inn
7.52
Hanes
6.39
Southwest
6.16
Budget
6.71
Thrifty
7.21
Hyundai
6.27
Dell
4.55
Panasonic
4.56
Converse
6.11
University of Phoenix
7.11
Baton Rouge
7.53
Community College
Air Tran
5.76
* 9 point scale with 1 (luxury) and 9 (frugal)
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8.61
7.66
5.97
6.66
7.03
6.73
7.60
6.68
5.32
5.76
5.24
7.71
6.29
6.23
5.32
6.15

Employed in Main
Study?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

4.21

No

APPENDIX III
SCALE ITEMS: MATERIALISM (GENERAL)
1. It is important to me to have really nice things.
2. I would like to be rich enough to buy anything I want.
3. I'd better be happier if I could afford to buy more things.
4. It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't afford to buy all of the things I would like.
5. People place too much emphasis on material things.
6. It's really true that money can buy happiness.
(Note: 1. Item 5 has been deleted to improve the reliability, 2. Scale from Richins and Dawson
(1992).)
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APPENDIX IV
PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR ESSAY 3

Mood (Positive
vs. Negative)

Implicit
Attitude

Preference
(Wholesome vs.
Decadent)

Explicit
Attitude

Preference
(Wholesome vs.
Decadent)

Goal Prime
(e.g.,
Wholesome,
Decadent)

Goal Prime
(e.g.,
Wholesome,
Decadent)

Mood (Positive
vs. Negative)

Manipulated Variables: Goal Prime, Mood,
Measured variables: Explicit Attitude, Implicit Attitude, Preference
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APPENDIX V
DETAILED PRETEST RESULTS: DECADENT BRAND NAMES
Decadent
Ben & Jerry's
Haagen-Dazs
Godiva
Snickers
Pepperidge Farm
Cookie
Wolfgang Puck
Starbucks
Coke
Krispy Kreme
Wonka
Dove-Chocolate
Twix
Ghirardelli
A1Steaksauce
Oreo
Pepsi
Swissmiss
Kit Kat
Chips Ahoy
Doritos
Starburst
Frito-Lay
DiGiorno
Heineken
Sprite
Kendall-Jackson
Pringles
Coffee-Mate
McDonald's
California Pizza
Kitchen
Café Du Monde
Texas De Brazil
Seattle's Best
Nescafe
Taster's Choice

Wholesome Familiarity

6.47
6.26
6.06
6.03
5.59

5.97
5.59
5.24
5.94
5.88

7.24
5.76
5.71
8.35
6.50

7.03
6.06
6.24
7.32
6.65

Employed in
Main Study?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

5.12
6.47
6.21
5.53
5.32
6.24
6.06
5.97
5.82
5.71
5.71
5.65
5.50
5.47
5.44
5.41
5.38
5.12
5.06
5.06
4.91
4.91
4.88
4.82
4.79

5.06
6.15
6.24
4.62
5.15
5.97
5.65
5.21
6.53
5.85
5.94
5.94
5.59
5.97
6.18
5.44
5.76
5.85
5.00
5.85
4.82
5.62
5.32
4.65
5.53

5.09
8.24
8.71
7.44
6.76
7.26
7.82
5.53
7.94
8.09
8.47
6.15
8.06
8.03
8.24
7.82
7.91
6.59
7.06
8.26
2.91
7.59
6.74
8.47
4.32

5.26
6.85
7.91
6.00
6.26
6.82
7.41
6.21
6.71
7.26
7.32
6.24
7.09
7.35
7.65
7.00
7.38
6.44
5.26
7.12
4.88
7.06
6.18
6.88
5.59

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

4.76
4.62
4.56
4.56
4.41

4.82
4.65
4.94
5.35
5.06

2.74
2.97
3.74
4.79
3.88

5.00
4.71
5.18
5.09
4.85

No
No
No
No
No
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Positive

APPENDIX VI
DETAILED PRETEST RESULTS: WHOLESOME BRAND NAMES
Wholesome Decadent

Dannon
Yoplait
Cheerios
Quaker Oats
Fiber One
Healthy choice
V8
Dole
Kashi
Special K
Nature valley
Planters peanuts
Sun-Maidraisins
Tropicana
Yoplait
Fiberone
Welch'S
Kashi
Oceanspray
Prego
Minutemaid
Heinz
Eggland's Best
Pillsbury
Bisquick
Olive-Garden
Delmonte
Weightwatchers
Craisins
Saralee
Smucker'S
Nakedjuice
Sunbeambread
Birdseye
Kleinpeter

6.89
6.71
7.71
7.29
6.68
6.89
7.64
6.93
6.61
7.54
7.43
6.86
6.75
6.75
6.71
6.68
6.68
6.61
6.61
6.57
6.57
6.46
6.39
6.36
6.21
6.11
6.04
5.89
5.89
5.86
5.75
5.75
5.64
5.54
5.00

5.36
5.36
5.25
4.89
5.18
5.36
5.79
5.57
4.93
5.86
5.43
5.25
5.00
5.46
5.36
5.18
5.14
4.93
5.11
5.32
5.82
5.36
5.25
5.29
4.75
5.96
5.64
4.39
4.64
5.79
5.14
5.29
4.96
5.14
4.71
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Familiarity Positive Employed
in Main
Study?
7.18
7.00
Yes
6.86
7.00
Yes
7.96
7.64
Yes
7.50
7.32
Yes
5.96
5.61
Yes
6.54
6.36
Yes
7.64
7.04
Yes
7.46
7.25
Yes
5.04
5.68
Yes
7.39
7.25
Yes
6.89
7.21
No
7.61
7.61
No
7.11
6.75
No
7.61
7.46
No
6.86
7.00
No
5.96
5.61
No
7.79
6.96
No
5.04
5.68
No
7.07
6.75
No
7.50
7.00
No
7.75
7.14
No
8.14
7.43
No
4.61
5.29
No
7.93
7.64
No
7.39
7.00
No
7.79
7.54
No
5.18
5.86
No
6.57
5.43
No
5.04
5.43
No
7.21
6.96
No
7.21
6.86
No
3.71
5.68
No
4.14
5.14
No
4.00
5.36
No
2.43
4.86
No

APPENDIX VII
SCALE ITEMS: SELF-CONTROL
1. I am good at resisting temptation.
2. I have a hard time breaking bad habits. (R)
3. I am lazy. (R)
4. I say inappropriate things. (R)
5. I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun. (R)
6. I refuse things that are bad for me.
7. I wish I had more self-discipline. (R)
8. People would say that I have iron self- discipline.
9. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done. (R)
10. I have trouble concentrating. (R)
11. I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals.
12. Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong. (R)
13. I often act without thinking through all the alternatives. (R)
Note: Scale from Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004)
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